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1.0 SUMMARY
A preliminary hazards analysis of a nuclear reactor power system for
surface power generation on the moon and Mars as part of the Space Exploration
Initiative has been performed. The rigor and scope of the analysis was
consistent with the conceptual state of the 1988 System Design Review SP-IO0
Reference Flight S_stem design for the potential applications and the current
detail of the mission descriptions. The objective of the study was to
identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor systems for use on the
lunar and martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such
issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means. This
study does not address safety issues for a reactor which is part of a
propulsion system. However, the use of such a system will have an impact on
the mission profile and this has been taken into account.
All safety aspects of nuclear reactor systems from prelaunch ground
handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of
detail for SP-IO0 reactor design, launch vehicle and space transport vehicle
designs, and mission descriptions. The analysis of missions to the moon and
Mars has been conducted by concentrating on events not previously covered in
past aerospace nuclear safety studies. Information from those previous
aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate.
Safety requirements for the SP-]O0 space nuclear reactor system were
compiled from available published documents. Mission profiles for typical
lunar and martian flights were defined with emphasis on activities after low
earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for
the new mission phases. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases
with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of
the SP-]O0 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety
issues not covered by the SP-]O0 program were identified. Additionally, the
resolution approaches of the SP-]O0 program were examined in light of the moon
and Mars missions.
The key results of the study are summarized in Table 2-1. This table
presents the governing requirements and the resolution approaches identified
to meet the requirements. Each of the safety issues listed in Table 2-I are
summarized below including the resolution approaches.
Decay Heat Removal
The SP-IO0 Reference Flight System uses the primary coolant loop and the
auxiliary coolant loop systems to remove decay heat from the reactor core
after shutdown. These systems have been designed for operation in zero-g
space. A steady state analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of
designing a primary heat transport loop with the capability of removing
reactor decay heat by natural convection. The study was based upon an SP-IO0
reactor operating on the lunar surface with either a Brayton or a Stirling
power conversion subsystem. Temperature differences developed across the
reactor as a function of height and pipe diameter for one second and 50
seconds after slt_tdow.lwere on the order of ]00 C to 200 C for a configuration
of 6 m from reactor to heat exchanger with 8 cm diameter pipe. Thus,
excessive temperatures would not occur if the reactor design used natural
Table 1-1
Summary of Resolution Approaches to Key Safety Issues of Nuclear Reactors as
Planet Surface Power Systems for the Space Exploration Initiative
(Sheet 1 of 2)
Safety Issue Requirement Resolution Approach
Decay heat removal
Reactor control
Low risk
Low risk
Disposal Low risk
Criticality
End-of-life
shutdown
Radiation exposure
release
Mars environment
High speed impact
on the earth, moon
and Mars
Subcritical in
all credible
accident
conditions
Low risk
ALARA
Low risk
Low risk
Use containment vessel for loss of
coolant accident; use natural
convection otherwise.
Investigate need for poison-backed
reflectors to reduce backscattering
by close proximity shielding.
Use methods with minimum astronaut
interaction; provide adequate long
term safe disposal with minimum
risk.
Neutron absorbers; design to survive
new launch and transport vehicle
accident environments; use
expendable launch vehicles so
reactor is above solid rocket
boosters.
Automatic, single fault tolerant
clock mechanism; irreversible power
interruption to control actuators.
Need radiation exposure limits and
controls for all power sources
(stationary and mobile); must
consider all potential missions.
Use reliable coatings on or
isolation from the martian
environment of refractory metals;
consider using lower temperature
materials (stainless steel, etc.)
compatible with the martian
environment.
Design reactor to survive earth
reentry intact; rely upon highly
reliable transfer vehicle guidance
systems for moon and Mars.
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Table 1-1
Summary of Resolution Approaches to Key Safety Issues of Nuclear Reactors as
Planet Surface Power Systems for the Space Exploration Initiative
(Sheet 2 of 2)
Safety Issue Requirement Resolution Approach
Return flyby
trajectories to the
moon and Mars
Low risk Eject nuclear reactor into space to
avoid inadvertent earth reentry or
design highly reliable transfer
vehicle to accommodate excess return
mass during earth orbit insertion.
convection in the primary coolant loop should the secondary heat transfer loop
fail to provide a heat sink.
A potential method to accommodate a loss of coolant accident is
containment of the primary coolant loop inside a guard vessel. The guard
vessel would be designed so that the captured coolant would cover the reactor
and decay heat would be rejected by heat pipes attached to the guard vessel
wall. A cursory steady state thermal analysis for a lunar application
resulted in a temperature drop from the reactor to the guard vessel on the
order of 525 C to 550 C. However, the analysis indicated that it is possible
to remove the decay heat by boiling. For Mars, the pressure inside the guard
vessel would have to be kept at or below the martian atmospheric pressure so
that the lithium saturation temperature would be well below the normal
operating temperature of the reactor. A transient analysis is required to
estimate peak fuel cladding temperatures to verify this method of
accommodating a loss of coolant accident.
Reactor Control
Reactor control with BeO reflectors may not be adequate for a man-rated
reactor. Leakage out the reactor may be significantly reduced by a man-rated
shield in close proximity to the reactor. Poison-backed reflectors may be
required to reduce the backscattering produced by the shield. An analysis is
required.
Currently, the possibility of astronauts performing maintenance or
repair activities is remote. As such, consideration should not be given to a
reactor design which allows for replacement and maintenance of reflectors,
safety rods, and reflector and rod drive mechanisms.
Inadvertent reactor startup must be prevented by use of lock mechanisms
to maintain shutdown rods inside the reactor core and reflectors in their
least reactive position.
Disposal
The problem of safe disposal of the used nuclear reactor core is a
complex issue. The problem involves fuel and fission product containment,
radiation exposure and diversion. Three disposal schemes were examined: I)
storage in place, 2) storage away from the power production area, and 3)
insertion into a parabolic trajectory. Disposal by insertion into a parabolic
trajectory from the moon and Mars has the potential for accidents during
launch from the planet surface and boost from orbit around the planet. These
accidents may leave the planet surface or the orbit contaminated. An
unplanned retrieval from orbit will create circumstances for additional
accidents and significant radiation exposure to astronauts if their presence
is required. Disposal by launching the used reactor core to a nuclear safe
orbit about the moon or Mars would result in the used reactor presenting a
hazard for future flights.
Lunar and Mars surface disposal, i.e., storage in place or away from the
power production area, eliminates the hazards associated with schemes that
require launching from the planet surface for disposal. However,
environmental safety concerns become important for long periods of time.
During long storage times, provisions must be made to restrict access to the
storage areas and provide for passive decay heat removal.
Any method of surface storage of the used nuclear reactor fuel would be
dependent upon the need to remove the used core from the power production area
for such purposes as reusing portions of the existing power system versus the
ability to safely remove the used core without overexposing the astronauts or
contaminating the environment while removing the spent fuel. This issue has
been considered should the decision be made in the future to require the
removal of the reactor from the vicinity of the base. A commitment to
permanent human occupation of the lunar surface may require removal of the
used reactors from the base area to avoid clustering these radioactive sources
around the base. Spent fuel removal could be accomplished by means of robots
to prevent astronaut exposure. Should the use of robots to remove the fuel
fail, remedial efforts may be required; these should minimize astronaut
exposure. Spent reactor fuel stored on Mars would be required to withstand
the martian environment for many years. A risk assessment must be performed
to assist in determining which disposal scheme is best. The disposal strategy
must have minimum astronaut interaction and adequate long term safe storage
with minimum risk.
Criticality
The SP-IO0 is being designed to remain subcritical during launch
accidents by providing sufficient negative reactivity and the structural
capability to retain this negative reactivity. Neutron absorber rods will be
locked into place inside the reactor core at launch to be removed only upon
the startup command. These rods have been designed to keep the reactor core
subcritical under all postulated reactor configurations resulting from
explosions, projectiles, fragments, and shrapnel. Hydrocode analyses by
General Electric (Ref. I-]) h_ve t_eenpe_formed to verify the rods will remain
in the reactor core during the explosion environments resulting from failures
of the space shuttle. Nuclear reactor accommodation of the explosion
environments possible during any phase of the moon and Mars missions is not
known at this time due to the lack of sufficient design detail of the launch,
transfer, and excursion vehicles. The use of an expendable launch vehicle may
eliminate solid rocket motor casing fragments as a safety concern since the
reactor should be located above any fragment field generated in an explosion
of the launch vehicle.
Larger launch vehicles have been proposed for the moon and Mars
missions. When sufficient design details are forthcoming, data characterizing
the environments resulting from launch vehicle failures will have to be
generated and compiled in the same manner as has been done for the Space
Shuttle and the Titan IV. These new environments and failure rates will then
be used to design the SP-IO0 or any other reactor to remain subcritical in
these environments. The reactor system will be required to maintain
subcriticality in the new launch vehicle explosion environments. The SP-IO0
program has shown that the fuel and safety rod alignment is maintained in the
explosion environments radial implosion, lateral overpressure load against one
side of the reactor, axial overpressure load, SRB fragment impact, shrapnel
impact, and secondary impact.
End-of-Life Shutdow_
End-of-life shutdown is a safety issue because a nuclear reactor that
fails to shutdown may preclude access to the power production site to emplace
a replacement reactor. Final shutdown should be accomplished by a clock
mechanism which will activate at a preset time set prior to operation. The
clock mechanism must be single fault tolerant. It must operate independently
of the reactor operating mode or the power conversion subsystem operation. It
must also irreversibly interrupt the power supply to the reactor control
drives, both safety rods and reflectors.
Radiation Exposure
Radiation exposure control during operation and maintenance will involve
shielding, distance, and time wherever practical. The particular radiation
exposure limits for astronauts has not been clearly defined.
Radiation exposure controls for astronauts need to include the effects
of all sources of natural and man-made radiation, both stationary and mobile.
Past shielding studies for stationary and mobile systems have ignored the
presence of sources of man-made radiation in addition to the reactor. An
allocation of exposure to natural and man-made radiation is required. An
analysis must be performed of potential astronaut activity on the surface of
the moon and Mars to characterize the potential for exposure of the astronauts
to man-made radiation sources. From this characterization, an optimum dose
limit allocation between mobile and stationary man-made radiation sources can
be made.
The characterization of astronaut activities for the purpose of dose
limit allocations must include all potential missions. A dose limit based
upon a 30 day astronaut stay w111 resul_ i_ astronaut overexposure during the
600 day lunar mission dress rehearsal for the missions to Mars. Dose limits
should be based upon the longest potential astronaut stay expected during the
lifetime of the nuclear reactor surface power system.
Dose limits have not been suggested based upon a realistic and complete
set of dose plane locations. Dose limits for man-made radiation emanating
from surface nuclear reactors have been proposed for the habitat area at
various distances from the power production area (e.g., I km and 5 km), at
arbitrary distances, and at the inner-most point of the radiator panels.
Proper sizing and comparison of shielding alternatives will require the
allocation of dose limits at prescribed locations. Various astronaut
activities will require them to perform duties at the habitat area, at the
launch/landing site, at the soil processing plant, and at locations away from
the outpost which will require travel outside the protection of the habitat on
surface rovers. A total dose limit must be recognized as the summation of the
doses acquired from the various locations at which astronauts will be
performing their duties. Also, dose limits should be separated into nominal
and emergency limits. A nominal limit should reflect the diversity of duties
required of an individual astronaut. Emergency limits should be set to
reflect the availability of an excursion vehicle for outpost abandonment in
addition to the consequences to the astronauts of power system failure.
Mars Environment
In addition to the C02 atmosphere, the martian soil has been found to
contain oxidants. The martian soil is periodically entrained and suspended in
the atmosphere by surface winds. Also, H2SO4 and HCl aerosols are believed to
be present in the wind blown dust. Reactor materials will be required to
withstand the CO 2 atmosphere and these oxidants and acids during operation and
long term storage if final disposal is on the surface of Mars.
Research is required for material compatibility with the martian
environment. Coatings such as silicide for refractory metals need to be
investigated for long term reliability. Reactor designs using alternate
materials, such as stainless steel, which operate at lower temperatures and
are compatible with the martian environment need to be considered. Isolation
of the refractory materials from the martian environment should be
investigated as a potential solution. The refractory metals could be encased
in a vessel which supports a vacuum or inert atmosphere between the outside
vessel and the inner refractory materials, e.g., encase the primary coolant
loop piping in a stainless steel tubing with a vacuum between them.
Hioh Speed Impact on the Earth, Moon and Mars
High speed impacts are possible during a flight to the moon or Mars.
High speed impacts on the lunar and Mars surfaces may occur during moon/Mars
orbit insertion and descent to the surface. They may also occur during
launch from the earth and upon return to the earth should the space vehicle
fail to orbit the moon or Mars and return to the earth. The issue of a return
to earth without orbiting the moon or Mars is discussed below under the safety
issue of return flyby trajectories. An ;d_itional possibility for lunar
surface impact may occur if nuclear electric propulsion is used and the trans-
lunar orbit requires a gravity assist flyby of the moon. Impact speeds may be
as high as planet approach velocities since the moon has no atmosphere and
Mars has too little atmosphere to adequately slow down the spacecraft. The
reactor is unlikely to survive such an impact on the moon or Mars. The risk
to the mission from this type of accident will have to be estimated taking
into account flight path angle, incoming velocity, and the aerobrakes. Highly
reliable transfer vehicle guidance systems will minimize risk. The reactor
must be designed to survive earth reentry so that the risk to the general
population is insignificant.
Return FIyby Trajectories
Flights to the moon and Mars are likely to use trans-lunar and trans-
mars trajectories which will allow return to earth should the space vehicle
propulsion system fail to function for orbit insertion. This type of
trajectory would be failsafe. If a failure in the propulsion system used for
orbit insertion around the moon or Mars is detected during the trans-lunar or
trans-Mars trajectory phase of the mission or the system fails to operate when
commanded, a return flyby trajectory would allow the space vehicle to return
to earth with little or no additional thrusting for retrieval of astronauts
and cargo. The propulsion system may be either chemical or nuclear. The term
return flyby trajectory has been used to denote a trajectory from the earth to
the moon or Mars which would not require a significant thrust at the moon or
Mars to insert the space vehicle into a trajectory which will return the space
vehicle to the earth. The returning space vehicle would contain the original
cargo, including the surface power system reactor. The potential exists for
the returning space vehicle to reenter the earth's atmosphere should the
propulsion system failure preclude an earth avoidance maneuver. Reactor earth
reentry survival in a subcritical configuration will have to be guaranteed so
that the risk to the general population is insignificant.
The preferred resolution to reduce the risk to the general population to
an insignificant level would be ejection of the nuclear reactor at some time
in the return flyby trajectory when such an action poses very little threat to
the general population. This would be the most likely means of reducing the
threat since a return flyby trajectory would probably call for ejection of the
cargo and unused propellant since transfer vehicles do not appear to be
designed for insertion into low earth orbit with such a large mass. It is not
clear that the propulsion system for the SEI space vehicles would be capable
of earth orbit insertion with the full cargo. The return trajectory should
have a perigee altitude of at least 1000 km in case ejection of the reactor
fails. If ejection of the reactor is not possible, the transfer vehicles
would have to be designed to accommodate this mission abort scenario. The
transfer vehicle would have to be designed so that the aerobrake, or the
attached excursion vehicle, could safely insert the spacecraft into orbit
about the earth. The particular flight maneuvers associated with earth orbit
insertion should be chosen to minimize risk to the general population.
Because the reactor will not be operated until it is emplaced on the surface
of the moon or Mars, mission risk will not be aggravated by a fission product
inventory. The safety issue of a nuclear propulsion system as part of this
returning space vehicle was not addressed since it wac outside the scope of
this task.
Loss of Power to Habitat
This issue is not normally considered a nuclear safety issue. It has
been included here because it does have an impact on the safety of the
astronauts. The following discussion will have some application to any
central power system used on the moon and Mars.
In all cases where the nuclear reactor is shutdown due to a failure and
in some cases where power is reduced, the habitat will not have sufficient
power to maintain life support systems. It is the responsibility of the power
system designer to prevent a power system response which will place the
astronauts in a life threatening situation. An uninterruptible power source
must be provided which will maintain minimum life support capabilities.
Habitat power requirements in the case of nuclear reactor shutdown or
power-down will be time dependent based upon the response of the habitat life
support systems to a loss of power. An analysis must be performed to identify
the power needs of systems after a nuclear reactor power system shutdown or
power reduction.
A reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) analysis is
required of all surface power systems (including extravehicular mobility
units) with respect to meeting the life support requirements of the
astronauts. These life support requirements would include maintenance of the
excursion vehicle to provide the astronauts the option to abandon the outpost.
The goals of the RAM analysis must be consistent with the purpose of the
outpost and the restrictions placed upon any emergency options due to the
remoteness of the outpost from earth and the harsh environment in which the
outpost exists.
Reactors designed for low earth orbit applications are typically
required to meet reliability goals. Reliability goals are used for systems
which are not repairable. The nuclear reactor power system for the moon and
Mars may have some degree of repairability. Also, the availability of power
to the astronauts is most important. As such, it would seem that an
availability goal is more appropriate. A nuclear power system should be
designed with an availability goal(s) for power to sustain life support
systems and other vital power consumers as a part of a total power management
and distribution system of stationary and mobile power sources. A RAM
analysis is advised.
Recommendations
The scope of this study was to identify safety issues associated with
the use of nuclear reactors as lunar and martian surface power systems for the
Space Exploration Initiative. Resolution approaches to the safety issues were
identified without an extensive analytical assessment. Resolution options
were selected based upon previous analyses as appropriate. Where there was
inadequate information, data requirements and the methods to acquire the data
were identified. The following paragraphs discuss follow-on tasks.
Shielding optionscannot be properly evaluated at this point in the
Space Exploration Initiative. There is no comprehensive criteria against
which to evaluate and select the best option. A study should be performed to
characterize astronaut activities for the purpose of establishing dose limit
allocations. This study would define a global dose limit and then proceed to
allocate portions of this limit to the various activities astronauts will
perform. Admittedly, there is not enough data for a definitive set of
criteria, but there is enough data on mission activities to perform a
parametric analysis with the intent to bound the solution and reduce the
number of options. Additional data requirements can be identified. Shielding
impacts on mission activities can be identified to eliminate the potential for
dose requirements that would eliminate critical mission elements.
The next step in evaluating mission risk would be the construction of
complete event trees with projected accident probabilities based upon the best
available failure rate data on the launch vehicle and the space vehicles used
to transfer the reactor from earth orbit to the surface of the moon or Mars.
This step would identify failure rate data requirements. All mission phases
would be analyzed to allow a comprehensive comparison. Missing data could be
provided by data on similar systems and components operating in similar
environments. In combination with estimates of radiation source terms, the
event trees would be used to identify high risk contributors, by using a
relative risk index, that may have a large impact on nuclear reactor and power
conversion system design. The relative risk evaluation would begin the
process of identifying dominant mission risk contributors early in the design
process to preclude significant design changes during subsequent design
efforts when such changes would have a severe adverse effect on system
development. The relative risk index can be used to identify the dominant
risk contributors without the need to determine absolute mission risk.
The safety requirements listed in this study are primarily for a payload
launched on the Space Shuttle. The unmanned mission safety requirements are
the result of an initial cursory evaluation of SP-IO0 mission safety
requirements and their applicability to potential SEI missions. The
additional manned mission requirements were identified as part of this study.
A thorough evaluation of the applicability of the unmanned mission safety
requirements is needed to eliminate unnecessary requirements and to identify
missing requirements. The launch vehicles proposed for the SEI missions are
primarily expendable boosters. A study is required to ensure that the safety
requirements for these expendable launch vehicles have been identified.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
In the g0-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study conducted by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, power requirements and duty
cycles for the planetary (lunar and martian) surface systems were estimated.
A major conclusion of the study was the requirement for a nuclear reactor to
supply electrical power to planetary surface systems with duty cycles having
power demands during the lunar night.
The object of this task order was to report the results of a study to
investigate the safety issues associated with using a reactor as a source of
electrical energy to power planetary surface systems identified during the 90-
day study. This safety investigation defined mission profiles for nuclear
reactor applications on the moon and Mars. Accident scenarios and
environments were postulated. A qualitative safety assessment was performed.
The most advanced space nuclear reactor design program is the SP-]00
program. The SP-]00 reactor power system is being designed for generic
missions in orbit around the earth and not specifically for missions on the
surfaces of the moon and Mars. This study evaluated and resolved safety
issues associated with the missions to the moon and Mars. The effects of
....planet surface application on the SP-I00 design Werenoted.
This report begins with:a Summary of the results of the study in Chapter
2. Thisis i_ollowed by a discussion Of nUcTear reactor applications on the
moon and Mars in Chapter 3. Basic mission sequences for fiight_ to the moon
and Mars are then presentea. Mission phases for operation on planetary
surfaces and final disposal are also included. Next, the lunar and martian
environments are described since these environments have safety implications.
The current safety requirements for the SP-]00 reactor system are
presented in Chapter 4. This includes a list of safety requirements
documents.
Chapter 5 presents the defined mission profiles for the lunar and
martian _lights. ?he basis for these flights are the results of the 90-day
study and feedback during Task Order reviews. Further details have been added
to allow a reasonable identification of potential accidents. Separate mission
profiles have been defined for flights to the moon and Mars. The mission
profiles covered activities from fuel fabrication to disposal.
Potential accident scenarios and environments were identified for the
lunar and martian mission profiles. These scenarios and environments are
presented in Chapter 6. From the accident scenarios and environments, safety
issues were identified. The safety issues are presented in Chapter 7.
Safety issue resolution approaches are presented in Chapter 8. The
depth of the safety analysis and resolution approaches is commensurate with
the level of detail found in the results of the 90-day study. This chapter
contains a brief summary of SP-]00 program resolution approaches. It also
contains the results of an assessment of the lunar and martian _lis_io_
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elements not previously examined.
Chapter 9 presents a brief list of recommendations to enhance the safety
of a nuclear reactor throughout the various phases of the lunar and martian
missions.
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3.0 NUCLEAREACTORAPPLICATIONONEARSANDTHEMOON
The potential need for a nuclear reactor power system was identified in
the 90-day study to provide the electrical power required as the outposts'
power demands evolve into the hundreds of kilowatts. Also, a nuclear reactor
power system has a mass advantage over photovoltaic systems on the moon
because the length of the lunar night makes dedicated energy storage for
photovoltaic systems heavy. The reactor system could be part of a centralized
power production system wherein transmission cables would connect the reactor
with the other major areas of the lunar and martian outposts. The reactor
power system could also be a stand-alone unit dedicated to a specific
application. The location of the unit and the means to transmit the power to
the application will be dependent upon the amount of human interaction at the
site of the application.
The safe use of a nuclear reactor as an electrical power source on the
moon and Mars requires the system designer to consider all phases of the
mission, not just that part of the mission when the reactor is operating on
the surface of the planet. The design must be analyzed for potential harmful
effects to the general population, the environment of the earth, and mission
personnel during all mission phases.
As a starting point in this analysis, the safety analyst must be
knowledgeable of the circumstances to which his system will be subject during
the mission phases. This chapter begins with a discussion of basic mission
profiles defined for this study. The basic missions to the moon and Mars have
been defined assuming continuous occupation of the surface of the planet and
reuse of transportation vehicles. The discussion includes potential
perturbations from these basic mission profiles to provide a comprehensive
safety assessment. Alternate mission sequences include direct launch to the
moon and Mars, transport vehicle assembly in low earth orbit away from the
space station, reactor emplacement on the surface of the planet or buried,
intermittent outpost occupancy, and disposal by surface or away-from-surface
strategies (detailed mission profiles are presented in Chapter 4). This is
followed by a section on the lunar and martian environment as they pertain to
safety.
The flight plans for missions to the moon and Mars are currently under
evaluation. To provide a basis for a safety evaluation of the use of a
nuclear reactor as a power source for surface systems on the moon and Mars,
basic mission sequences have been assumed. The basis for the basic mission
sequences defined for this study was Reference Approach A (Ref. Ill-l).
Reference Approach A was chosen because it appeared to contain the greatest
level of activity, as opposed to Reference E, and thus would provide a
comprehensive treatment. Variations of these basic mission sequences have
been defined in this study to include the latest proposals by NASA and other
potential alternatives. The details of the mission sequences are in Chapter
4.
During the exploration of the moon, flight plans will change with lunar
outpost evolution. As the lunar outpost evolves to decrease dependency oi
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earth, flight plans wili_nclude reuse of systems,_e_g., the lunar transfer
vehicle and the lunar excursion vehicle (LEV). Prior to the establishment of
the lunar excursion vehicle servicer on the moon, the lunar transfer and
excursion vehicles will be flown in an expendable mode. With the addition of
the LO2 plant on the moon, the transfer and excursion vehicles will be flown
in a reusable mode.
Flights to Mars will follow much the same pattern as the lunar flights.
The one significant exception is the first manned flight. For a chemical
propulsion system, both transfer and excursion vehicles will be flown in an
expendable mode with the transfer vehicle aerobrake, if used, jettisoned at
Mars. The flight crew will transfer to an Apollo-like reentry vehicle for
direct reentry to earth. The transfer vehicle will either be lost in space or
burnup upon reentry to earth. If the propulsion system is nuclear-based, the
returning astronauts may enter into an earth orbit on all missions including
the first. This first manned flight with a chemical propulsion system is
mentioned for the sake of completeness. The long flight times to Mars
involved with chemical propulsion will likely preclude the use of chemical-
based rocket engines. In any case, there is always the possibility of using
an Apollo-like reentry capsule on a Mars mission regardless of the propulsion
system; throwaway nuclear rocket engines may be used and return to earth may
be by direct reentry in an Apollo-like capsule without the use of a propulsion
system for orbit insertion.
3.1 LUNAR OUTPOST
The typical delivery of cargo and crew to the lunar outpost, Figure 3-1,
will begin with launches of lunar payload, crew, and propellants from earth to
Space Station Freedom. At Space Station Freedom, these items are loaded onto
the lunar transfer vehicle. The lunar transfer vehicle subsequently
rendezvous with the lunar excursion vehicle in lunar orbit. Payload, crew,
and the necessary propellants are transferred to the lunar excursion vehicle.
The lunar excursion vehicle subsequently descends to the lunar surface. The
lunar transfer vehicle returns to Space Station Freedom. Servicing and
maintenance of the lunar transfer vehicle will be performed at Space Station
Freedom while the same will be performed for the lunar excursion vehicle at
the lunar outpost. Alternatives to this basic mission sequence are direct
launch to the moon, e.g., Apollo flights; launch to low earth orbit for
assembly of the lunar transport vehicles; direct descent to the lunar surface;
and the use of expendable vehicles.
There will be both piloted and cargo-only flights as identified in Ref.
III-]. A limited exploration program may have astronauts on every flight. A
piloted flight will deliver cargo and a four man crew to the lunar surface
with subsequent return of the crew and a limited amount of cargo. A cargo
flight will deliver only cargo with the lunar transfer vehicle left on the
surface or returned empty. Both flights will use common lunar transfer and
excursion vehicles. Direct launch and descent missions may use what would be
defined as a single vehicle with stages. A piloted flight will require the
addition of a crew module while the cargo flights will use only some type of
cargo pallet. Cargo flights where the lunar transfer and excursion vehizles
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are expended will provide the maximum transfer of mass to the lunar surface.
Piloted flights will likely use an earth-to-moon trajectory which will allow a
safe return to the earth should the propulsion system fail to allow proper
insertion into an orbit about the moon. The trajectory would allow the
astronauts to fly behind the moon and then return to the earth with little or
no thrusting. The assumption has been made that an Apollo-like reentry would
be required at the earth. The disposition of the rest of the cargo and space
vehicle is unknown; the cargo and vehicle would either fly past the earth,
orbit, or enter the atmosphere.
Heavy-lift launch vehicles will be utilized to deliver the lunar
payloads, vehicles, and propellants to Space Station Freedom in the basic
mission sequence. These same vehicles, or variations, would be used to
deliver material to low earth orbit or to launch directly to the moon. The
launch vehicles will be either a derivative of the Shuttle or a version of the
Advanced Launch System, Figure 3-2. Both launch vehicles will have a payload
shroud large enough to allow lunar transfer and excursion vehicles to be
launched virtually intact during the early expendable flights. One launch
will deliver the lunar transfer and excursion vehicles and two subsequent
launches will deliver the necessary lunar transfer and excursion vehicle
propellants. Early piloted flights will have the lunar transfer and excursion
vehicles, Figure 3-3, packaged to be launched on a single heavy-lift vehicle.
The package will contain a fully fueled lunar transfer vehicle core
propulsion/avionics module, the aerobrake central core and peripheral
segments, the lunar transfer vehicle crew module, the lunar excursion vehicle
crew cab, and a partially fueled lunar excursion vehicle. The Shuttle will
deliver crew and cargo. All early flights will expend the lunar transfer and
excursion vehicles. Direct launch and descent flights will have launch
configurations similar to early expendable flights but with fully fueled
vehicles.
At Space Station Freedom, the eight peripheral aerobrake segments will
be attached to the central core of the lunar transfer vehicle and the
combination examined for structural integrity. The aerobrake will be
refurbished and verified after each flight up to a total of five flights.
Similar work is assumed performed at a low earth staging orbit not at Space
Station Freedom.
Two heavy-lift vehicles will deliver to Space Station Freedom the
expendable propellant tanks for the lunar transfer vehicle. Two of the
propellant tanks will be jettisoned after trans-lunar orbit injection and the
remaining two will be jettisoned in low lunar orbit. The same sequence of
propellant tank delivery and empty tank ejection was assumed when a low earth
staging orbit was used in place of operations at Space Station Freedom. A
direct launch mission was assumed to also jettison empty fuel tanks.
When the lunar excursion vehicle is reused, cryogenic propellants and
consumables will be transferred from the lunar transfer vehicle. L02 mined on
the lunar surface will be used by the lunar excursion vehicle when available;
LH2 will always originate from earth.
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Figure 3-3 Lunar Transportation System (Ref. III-4).
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An automated rendezvous and docking system is provided in the lunar
transfer vehicle for rendezvous with a lunar excursion vehicle in lunar orbit
and with Space Station Freedom upon return from the moon. This system will
have manual override provisions for piloted flights.
The reused lunar excursion vehicle, Figure 3-4, will be based on the
lunar surface or stored in lunar orbit. On the lunar surface it will be
covered by a thermal tent and out-gassing will be controlled by the lunar
excursion vehicle servicer stationed at the launch area. The legs and landing
pads will be provided with height control for landing on unimproved areas.
The excursion vehicle engines will provide single engine-out capability. They
will be fueled with LH2 and LO2.
An expended lunar excursion vehicle was assumed to be left in lunar
orbit.
3.2 MARTIAN OUTPOST
Delivery of crew and cargo to Mars in the basic mission sequence is very
similar to delivery to the moon. The flight profile is shown in Figure 3-5.
Payload, crew, and propellants are launched from earth to Space Station
Freedom where transfer and excursion vehicles are assembled, inspected, and
fueled. The assembled vehicles are then inserted into a transfer orbit to
Mars. At Mars the vehicles separate and use aerobrakes for Mars capture. In
orbit, the vehicles rendezvous and the crew transfers from the transfer
vehicle to the excursion vehicle. Descent to the martian surface is
accomplished by aerobrake and descent engines. The aerobrake is jettisoned
during reentry. Once on the surface, the crew lives in a habitat which has
been delivered as cargo either on the same excursion vehicle or a previous
one. Ascent from the surface will be accomplished using an upper stage of the
excursion vehicle. This part of the excursion vehicle will rendezvous with
the orbiting transfer vehicle to transfer crew and cargo for the return trip
to earth. Capture at earth will be accomplished by transfer vehicle
aerobrake. The transfer vehicle will then rendezvous with Space Station
Freedom for refurbishment.
Flight maneuvers include injection into the trans-Mars orbit, aerobrake
capture at Mars, and descent and landing at Mars. The return portion of the
mission involves ascent from the martian surface, rendezvous in martian orbit
with the transfer vehicle, injection into the trans-earth orbit, and capture
at earth. The two captures will be accomplished by aerobraking.
Aeromaneuvering of the excursion vehicle will allow cross-range landing
capability for an out-of-plane (orbital) landing site. The early piloted
expeditionary missions will use an Apollo-like reentry capsule for the crew to
reenter directly to the surface of the earth. The nominal entry velocities at
Mars and earth are 8.5 kilometers per second and 12.5 kilometers per second,
respectively. An aborted mission is expected to see a larger earth reentry
velocity.
]8
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Figure 3-4 Lunar Excursion Vehicle (Ref. Ill-l).
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Alternatives to the basic mission sequence maneuvers include direct
launch and descent to Mars with a single transfer vehicle from earth to Mars
and back. Transfer vehicle assembly may be performed in low earth orbit in
place of Space Station Freedom. Also, chemical transfer vehicle engines may
be replaced with nuclear propulsion engines. A potential nuclear electric
driven trans-Rars orbit trajectory can be seen in Figure 3-6. A nuclear
thermal driven transfer vehicle would follow a trajectory similar to that of
the basic mission sequence. The assumption was made that all nuclear
propulsion driven transfer vehicles would not use an aerobrake for insertion
into orbits around the earth and Mars.
As with the lunar flights, there would be piloted and cargo flights to
Mars. A limited exploration program may involve only flights with cargo and
astronauts. Cargo flights will be composed of excursion vehicles only. There
will be no orbiting transfer vehicle. The excursion vehicles will separate at
Mars and be captured by means of the aerobrakes, if used. For the first cargo
flight, the excursion vehicles may descend to the martian surface and remain
there. For all flights, the lower stage of the excursion vehicle will be
expended. It appears that the upper portion of excursion vehicles will be
operated in an expendable mode. All piloted flights will likely use
trajectories that allow the crew to fly by Mars and return to earth should the
mission be aborted due to propulsion failure with little or no thrusting. The
possibility exists that similar flyby trajectories may be used for cargo
flights to recover the cargo and space vehicle. It is not clear how the
returning space craft would be captured by the earth's gravity to orbit about
the earth since a failed propulsion system may also preclude use of a
propulsion system for orbit insertion about the earth. The possibility is
included for completeness. If the decision is made to not recover the space
vehicle and cargo from an aborted mission, there will be no nuclear reactor
returning to the earth and thus, no safety issue.
Launch vehicles for the exploration of Mars will be a larger class of
heavy-lift vehicles with roughly double the capacity of the lunar heavy-lift
vehicles. Conceptual designs are shown in Figure 3-7. An obvious observation
is that this class of launch vehicles will have payloads located above the
solid rocket boosters. In a launch explosion, fragments from the solid rocket
boosters should not be a safety concern. The possibility that the Space
Shuttle may be used to lift cargo to Space Station Freedom, if it is used as a
staging area, should not be ignored. The Space Shuttle was mentioned (Ref.
III-I) as a means to lift cargo for the lunar missions and the potential for
the same strategy for martian flights may exist.
The transfer vehicle consists of a core vehicle and an expendable
injection stage fueled by LH2 and L02, Figure 3-8. Subsequent to injection
into the trans-Mars orbit at Space Station Freedom, the injection stage is
jettisoned. The injection stage consists of five core propulsion systems of
engines and propellant tanks with the potential for three additional strap-on
propellant tanks. The strap-on propellant tanks will be the same
configuration as the core system tanks.
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Figure 3-8 Mars Transportation System (Ref. III-l).
24
The large aerobrake on the transfer vehicle will.... be used for capture at
Mars and the earth on missions subsequent to the eariy expeditionary missions
which will use an Apollo-like reentry vehicle upon return to earth. Aerobrake
lift will provide trajectory control and drag will slow the vehicle. The
aerobrake heat shield wil1 be designed to survive high-velocity earth reentry
and capture. Transfer vehicle propulsion for return to earth from Mars will
be provided by four engines of the design developed for the lunar transfer
vehicle.
The excursion vehicle, Figures 3-8 and 3-g, consists of two rocket
stages and an aerobrake. The aerobrake is identical in shape and size to the
transfer vehicle aerobrake. It will provide lift to maneuver from parking
orbit to a landing site on the surface of Mars. It will also contain a heat
shield for capture at Mars. No mention was made whether this heat shield
would survive earth reentry. Landing legs are deployed and the descent
engines are ignited after the aerobrake is Jettisoned. The five descent
engines of the lower stage and the three ascent engines of the upper stage
will provide single engine-out capability. They will be fueled with LH2 and
L02.
Nuclear propulsion concepts for the transport vehicle are shown in
Figures 3-10 and 3-11. The nuclear thermal engine would burn for a very short
time in the vicinity of the earth and Mars. Hydrogen would be the propellant.
Nuclear electric propulsion was assumed to require continual operation of the
engine during the trans-Mars and trans-earth trajectories. Another assumption
made was that crew rendezvous was necessary outside the van Allen radiation
belts. The nuclear electric propulsion system would require weeks to traverse
the radiation belts from low earth orbit. The nuclear electric powered
transport vehicle would have to use a low earth orbit for cargo and propellant
transfer.
25
Figure 3-9 Mars Excursion Vehicle (Ref. III-I).
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4.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
The following is a list of safety requirements compiled from the SP-IO0
space nuclear reactor program.
I. The maximum individual radiation dose to the public shall be
0.5 rem/yr. The limit for operations personnel is 5 rem/yr.
. Subcriticality shall be positively maintained assuming any
credible single failure or initiating event during all
normal assembly, transportation, handling, prelaunch, launch
ascent, deployment, orbit acquisition, end of life, and
permanent storage orbit operations.
.
The reactor shall have effective intrinsic negative
reactivity feedback for positive power and temperature
excursions.
. The reactor shall be designed to ensure with high confidence
the permanent subcriticality of the reactor at the final
shutdown. This final shutdown shall activate automatically,
shall be irreversible, and shall not be initiated or
rendered inoperable by any credible single failure or
initiating event.
o The reactor shall remain subcritical under the following
conditions:
a) Core internal structure and vessel generally intact
with all exterior components removed and with all
possible combinations of soil and water filling and
surrounding the core.
b) Core internal structure and vessel generally intact
with compaction along the pitch lines of the pins to
produce pin-to-pin contact, all exterior components
removed, and all possible combinations of soil and
water filling and surrounding the core.
c) Core internal structure and vessel generally intact
with compaction along the pitch line of the pins to
produce pin-to-pin contact, the normal exterior
components and reflectors compressed around the core;
the exterior absorber material, if any, in its normal
shutdown position; and the core containing it original
coolant or any possible combinations of soil and
water.
d) Core internal structure and vessel generally intact
with compaction along the pitch line of the pins to
produce pin-to-pin contact, all exterior components
removed, and aluminum surrounding the core containing
its original coolant.
e) Core internal structure and vessel generally intact
with all exterior component_ removed and the vessel
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exposed to a solid propellant fire.
m The unirradiated nuclear fuel shall pose no significant
environmental hazard.
. Engineered safety features shall be designed and built to
conform to STS-I (QA Assurance) and STS-2 (Reliability
Engineering).
J The coolability of the reactor shall be assured with high
confidence for all credible accident conditions to maintain
the structural integrity and thereby the predictability of
the desired reactor behavior during final shutdown.
gJ The reactor protection system shall
a) have two independent systems not subject to common
cause failure to reduce reactivity to a subcritical
state,
b) have the capability to sense conditions requiring
shutdown,
c) have an automatic shutdown capability,
d) be independent of the reactor control system except
for the neutron absorber (core-internal) and reflector
elements and their actuators,
e) have fault detection sensors with capability for test
during reactor operation,
f) have a fault detection system not subject to single
point failure,
g) have a fault detection system not subject to common
cause failures with systems and conditions upon which
it is called to activate in case of their failure,
h) be failsafe, and
i) have adequate shutdown margin.
I0. The reactor designer shall conduct a safety test and
analysis program to assess reactor response to postulated
credible accidents.
11. The reactor control system shall
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
require a positive coded signal for reactor startup,
be capable of controlling power escalation to full
power,
be capable of reducing power to a full shutdown mode,
be capable of controlling power and temperature
excursions, and
be capable of operation in a directed positive
shutdown mode.
12. Operating conditions requiring automatic shutdown are
failure of the reactor control system, exceeding nuclear
fuel design temperature limits, and failure of the reactor
control and/or safety systems con_ur,ica_ions .system.
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13.
16.
17.
18.
;)1.
Test and inspection programs for design and manufacture
shall include a plan to verify the design concept, to show
conformance to safety specifications, and to provide data
for quality control of manufacturing or engineered safety
features.
No planned reentry.
The reactor shall survive an inadvertent reentry in a
subcritical configuration with internal neutron shutdown
absorbers intact in a contiguous reactor core.
Following intact inadvertent reentry, the reactor shall be
designed to produce effective burial of radioactive
materials present upon impact on water, soil, or pavement-
grade concrete.
The reactor control and safety systems communications system
shall be composed of two independent subsystems with the
capability to monitor and/or control the status of the
reactor, the reactor control system, the power conversion
system, and all safety systems.
Independent electrical power shall be provided to the
reactor control and protection systems and their
communications system. These systems must operate
independent of the reactor operating mode or power
conversion system operation. Independent electrical power
must be provided to safety related systems for a minimum of
24 hours following failure of the power conversion system.
Quantities of toxic materials are to minimized.
The power system shall be designed to prevent a significant
release and dispersal of toxic materials during normal
operations in all mission phases with the potential for
human interaction with the system and when the system is
exposed to environments associated with credible failures
and accidents during these operations. Possible releases to
the atmosphere will be held within on-site and off-site
tolerance levels established by the appropriate regulatory
authority.
The instrumentation system shall provide, through reactor
control, protection and safety systems communication system,
signals to allow continuous determination of I) the reactor
power level and rate of change; 2) the fuel temperature; 3)
the positions of the control and reflector elements; and 4)
the status of the reactor control system, the reactor
protection system, the power conversion system, and the
independent electrical power source.
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22. Individual risk due to a mission shall be subject to ALARA
considering economic, technical and social factors.
The risk to the general population shall be subject to ALARA
considering economic, technical and social factors.
Design margins must reflect consideration of normal mission
operation system failure rates, accident probabilities and
environments.
25. Safety Technical Specifications must be prepared for
approval by the Department of Energy.
26. The reactor design shall enhance the ability to detect,
locate, and recover Special Nuclear Material.
27. The power system shall comply with NSTS 1700.7B and KHB
1700.7 safety requirements for STS payloads.
28. NHB 8071.1, JSC 18327, and AFSD SD-YV-O068 shall apply to
the design for fracture control of payloads launched on the
Space Shuttle. (The appropriate requirements for other
launch vehicles will apply for launch with those vehicles).
29. NSTS 14046 shall apply for structural design verification.
30. MSFC-SPEC-522 shall apply for control of stress corrosion
cracking.
31. The design shall be in accordance with JPL 601-4 (Aerospace
System Safety Guidelines).
32. MIL-STD-1576 shall apply for electro-explosive devices.
33. Fission products shall be contained within fuel pins through
permanent disposal.
34. Local fault propagation in reactor internals and core
assemblies shall be minimized due to flow blockages or flow
restrictions.
35. Fuel design specifications shall not be exceeded.
36. Potential meteoroid and space debris damage shall be
assessed per NASA SP-8042.
37. The power system shall be designed with reactivity limits to
assure the effects of postulated reactivity accidents can
neither result in damage to the coolant boundary nor disturb
the core, support structures, or other reactor internals.
38. The maximum programmable rate of change of reactor power
over the full power range shall be 1.5% of ful_ rated pbwer
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per minute.
39. Safety rod insertion probability shall be greater than
0.999.
40. Minimum voltage limits shall be set on critical loads bus
external to the reactor controller.
41. The power system shall be failsafe upon loss of power from
the launch vehicle.
42. The reactor monitoring systems shall include alarm
indications signalling the presence of abnormal conditions
while inside the STS payload bay and during pre-launch
operations.
43. Beryllium structures shall comply with NASA-JSC Letter ES2-
47-87.
44. NSTS defined Category I Hazards shall be two fault tolerant.
45. NSTS defined Category 2 Hazards shall be single fault
tolerant.
46. Software shall be subject to NSTS fault tolerance
requirements.
47. Normal power system functions shall not cause ignition of an
assumed flammable payload bay atmosphere during reentry,
landing and post-landlng operations. (This is a requirement
for launch in the NSTS).
48. Any mechanical interface with the launch vehicle shall be
capable of withstanding launch loads, abort loads (NSTS) and
orbit injection loads (NSTS).
49. Moving mechanical assemblies shall be designed per DoD-A-
83577.
50. Structural verification shall be performed as per AFSD SD-
YV-O067.
51. Contamination of launch vehicle materials by refractory
materials used in the nuclear power system shall not cause
launch vehicle material loss of ductility or loss of
material thickness by erosion.
$2. Power system manufacturing processes shall meet safety and
environmental regulations.
53. Batteries for the power system shall be designed in
accordance with NSTS 1700.7 and JSC 20793.
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54. Pressure vessels are to be compatible with room temperature
assembly and integration.
55. Composite structures shall comply with NSTS 1700.7.
56. The test connector to permit ground monitoring of reactor
instrument and control system status shall be independent of
the telemetry data stream and must be accessible in the
stowed launch configuration.
57. There shall be no planned release of hazardous materials
during NSTS operations.
58. The reactor power system design must comply with NHB
8060.IB.
59. Pre-launch repairs shall be performed in accordance with KHB
1700.7 and MIL-STD-1472.
60. Lightning protection shall be provided per JSC 07636.
61. Power system wiring shall tolerate 200% of expected current
load without exceeding insulation temperature rating.
62. Electronics performing safety functions must be capable of
withstanding SVS-]IS01 environments and comply with DoD-E-
8983.
63. System design shall provide protection of personnel per MIL-
STD-1472.
64. Maximum EMR fields while the power system is inside the NSTS
cargo bay shall comply with JSC 07700, Volume XIV,
Attachment I.
65. EVA required activity for the power system shall comply with
JSC 10615.
66. Power system elements shall be designed or marked to prevent
connection in a reverse mode.
67. Power system drawings shall include critical item
designations per SP-IO0 CIL instructions.
68. All reactor operations shall be supervised by qualified
personnel trained for reactor operation.
69. All main power returns shall be carried within a supply line
as a twisted, shielded pair.
70. The design shall have an overload protection limit of 55
amperes.
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It should be notedthat the above requirements are primarily for launch
on the NSTS, Launch with a vehicle other than the NSTS will require the
system designer and safety function to meet comparable requirements for that
launch vehicle.
Additional safety requirements would include that the reactor is not
operated in a power production mode until emplaced on the moon or Mars (Ref.
Ill-l) and the maximum individual radiation dose from lunar and martian
operations be dependent upon the overall mission risk and total dose from
natural and man-made radiation sources (Refs. IV-l, IV-2, IV-3, and IV-4).
The National Council on Radiation Protection has proposed an individual dose
guideline of 50 rem/yr from all radiation sources (Ref. IV-I). Power cable
design and placement at the outposts shall prevent astronaut contact with the
cables or prevent astronaut electrocution if contact is made. Also, power
reductions and reactor scram shall not result in the loss of critical life
support systems which would result in the loss of life prior to the restart of
the reactor power system or the use of supplementary power sources.
The requirements from the SP-]O0 program are for an unmanned mission.
For manned missions, the requirements listed in the preceding paragraph are
required in addition to those for unmanned missions. The unmanned mission
requirements are the result of an initial cursory evaluation of SP-IO0 mission
safety requirements and their applicability to potential SEI missions. The
additional manned mission requirements were identified in this study. A
thorough evaluation of the applicability of the above unmanned mission safety
requirements is needed to eliminate unnecessary requirements and to identify
missing requirements. The requirements listed in this chapter are primarily
for a payload onthe Space Shuttle. The launch vehicles proposed for the SEI
missions are primarily expendable boosters. A study is required to ensure
that the safety requirements for these expendable launch vehicles have been
identified. Finally, as launch vehicle designs and mission definitions
mature, the safety requirements presented have to be reassessed for
applicability and completeness.
A list of safety related documents is presented in Table 4-I.
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Table 4-1
Safety Related Documents
(Sheet 1 of 3)
Document Number Title
AFR 127-4
AFR 127-12
AFR 160-132
AFR 161-8
AFSD SD-YV-O067
AFSD SD-YV-OO6B
DoD-A-83577
DoD-E-B983
DOE Orders on Nuclear Safety
ICD 2-19001
JPL 601-4
JSC 07636
JSC 10615
JSC 18327
JSC 20793
Investigating and Reporting US Air Force
Mishaps
Air Force Occupational Safety, Fire
Protection and Health (AFOSH) Program
Control of Radiological Health Hazards
Control and Recording Procedures -
Occupational Exposure to Ionizing
Radiation
Structural Design Verification
Requirements for DoD Shuttle Payloads
Fracture Control Requirements for DoD
Shuttle Payloads
Assemblies, Moving Mechanical, for Space
Vehicles, General Specifications
Electronic Equipment, Aerospace, Extended
Space Environment, General Specification
Various titles (e.g., 5480.6 - Safety of
Department of Energy-Owned Nuclear
Reactors)
Shuttle Orbiter/Cargo Standard Interfaces
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Flight Projects
Safety Guidelines and Requirements
(lightning protection)
EVA Description and Design Criteria
Fracture Control Guidelines for STS
Payloads
Manned Space Vehicle, Battery Safety
Handbook
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Table 4-1
Safety Related Documents
(Sheet 2 of 3)
Document Number Title
JSC Letter ES2-47-87
KHB 1700.7
KHB 1860.1A
MSFC-SPEC-522
MIL-STD-1472
MIL-STD-]522
MIL-STD-]576
NASA SP-8013
NASA SP-8042
NCRP Report No. 98
NHB 8060.]B
NHB 8071.1
NSTS ]4046
(Johnson Space Center letter on beryllium
fracture control)
Space Transportation System Payload Ground
Safety Handbook
KSC Ionizing Radiation Protection Program
Design Criteria for Controlling Stress
Corrosion Cracking
Human Engineering Design Criteria for
Military Systems, Equipment, and
Facilities
Standard General Requirements for Safe
Design and Operation of Pressurized
Missile and Space Systems
Electroexplosive Subsystem Safety
Requirements and Test Methods for Space
Systems
Meteoroid Environment Model
earth to lunar Surface)
1969 (Near
Meteoroid Damage Assessment, NASA Space
Vehicle Design Criteria (Structures)
Guidance on Radiation Received in Space
Activities
Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing
Requirements and Test Procedures for
Materials in Environments That Support
Combustion
Fracture Control Requirements for Payloads
Using the National Space Transportation
System (NSTS)
Payload Verification Requirements
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Table 4-1
Safety Related Documents
(Sheet 3 of 3)
Document Number Title
NSTS 1700.7b
OSNP-I
SP-IO0 Program Safety
Technical Specifications
IOCFR20
Safety Policy and Requirements for
Payloads Using the Space Transportation
System
Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications
for Space Nuclear Reactors
Reference Flight System Specification
(SEO02)
Code of Federal Regulations, Title ]0,
Part 20 Standards for Protection
Against Radiation
E
L
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5.0 MISSION PROFILES
The process of identifying safety issues for the use of a nuclear power
system on the moon or Mars is a multistep process. To be comprehensive, the
safety analyst must become familiar with all aspects of the potential
application. Subsequently, potential hazards must be identified. The analyst
must then assess the response of the nuclear power system to these hazards.
From this response assessment, the analyst can estimate potential radiation
and toxic material sources that would be hazardous to humans. Using models
which simulate the transport of these hazards to humans, the analyst can
estimate the risk to the general population and to the environment of the
mission.
As an initial step in this process, this study has identified potential
hazardous environments for the nuclear power system which could results in
hazards to humans and the environment. No attempt has been made to eliminate
hazards, and thus, safety issues, by a quantitative assessment of the
probability of an event or the response of the nuclear power system and the
resulting hazardous source. The next step in the safety process would be the
determination of the probabilities of events leading to hazardous environments
for the nuclear power source and the characterization of these environments.
In order to identify potential hazardous environments for the nuclear
power system, the application (nuclear power source of electricity on the moon
and Mars) has been defined as allowed by available information. The process
of defining the application required descriptions of the potential mission
profiles. With these descriptions, including all reasonable possibilities,
potential hazardous environments for the nuclear power system could be
identified. Hazardous environments for humans were also identified as part of
this process. Chapter 5 presents descriptions of the potential mission
profiles and Chapter 6 presents potential hazardous environments for the
nuclear power system and the astronauts based upon the mission profiles
described in this chapter. In this manner, safety issues can be identified in
a comprehensive manner. As stated previously, the next step beyond this study
would be to assign event probabilities and characterize environments to allow
a quantitative assessment as to the relative risk involved. Obviously, events
with very low probability and safe reactor response would be eliminated as
safety issues.
Mission profiles for lunar and martian missions have been defined. A
basic mission profile has been assumed for each mission. The basic lunar
mission is based upon operation of transfer and excursion vehicles in a
reusable mode. The martian basic mission profile describes operations with
chemical rocket engines and aerobrakes and with an expendable excursion
vehicle. Potential alternate activities in a mission phase are also
discussed. The basic mission profiles with alternate mission phase activities
were selected to minimize the number of mission profiles examined but allow a
comprehensive assessment of safely issues.
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6.1 LUNAR OUTPOST
The top-level definition of the mission profile for a lunar flight has
been defined as shown in Table S-I. This closely follows lunar mission
Table 5-1
Lunar Mission Profile
Mission
Phase Mission Activity
I
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
g
10
Pre-launch
Launch to low earth orbit
Low earth orbit space vehicle assembly
Trans-lunar orbit insertion
Lunar orbit insertion
Rendezvous with lunar excursion vehicle
Descent to lunar surface
Emplacement
Operation and maintenance
Disposal
sequences defined by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in
References Ill-1 and V-] with the exception of phase 3. The exception was
final assembly of the lunar mission space vehicle in low earth orbit but not
at the space station. Figure 3-1 contains a drawing of a typical lunar flight
profile as defined in References III-] and V-I. This mission profile replaced
the mission phases dock with space station Freedom and space station Freedom
operations with low earth orbit space vehicle assembly operations. These
replaced mission phases are included in the analysis as options since the
possibility exists the space station mission in the future may include
operating as a rendezvous platform for the Space Exploration Initiative. The
following text in this section will present a more detailed description of the
above phases in the lunar mission profile.
Pre-!aunch
The detailed mission profile for the pre-launch phase of the lunar
mission is shown below in Table 5-2. It was assumed that control of the fuel
was limited to the Department of Energy until received at the launch site. A
similar procedure was followed for the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
for Galileo where the Department of Energy fabricated the fuel, assembled the
generators, tested them, and provided transportation between Department of
Energy sites and Kennedy Space Center. The Department of Energy delivered the
generators to an appropriate storage facility at the launch site. Intraplant
transfer, when it was required, was arranged by the launch site controlling
authority. The Department of Energy would manufacture the fuel pellets,
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Tabl e 5-2
Pre-launch Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activity
9
I0
11
Fabrication and assembly of reactor
Zero power testing of reactor
Package and ship reactor to launch
site
Mate reactor with balance of power
system, if required
Inspect and test
Store power system
Integrate power system with launch
vehicle
Transport launch vehicle to pad
and inspect
Load cryogenic propellants
Activate telemetry
Ignite liquid propellant engines
insert the pellets into the fuel rods, and insert the rods into the reactor
vessel, load the lithium, and seal the vessel. The unfueled reactor vessel
would have been shipped to a Department of Energy site by the power system
supplier for insertion of the fuel rods and lithium. The Department of Energy
would then transport the reactor to the launch site where it would become the
responsibility of the user agency, the launch agency and the power system
supplier as authorized by the launch site controlling authority. At the
launch site, the reactor would be inspected and placed into a storage
facility. The activities required at the launch site would be dependent upon
the reactor configuration as shipped to the launch site. The configuration of
the reactor at this time would depend upon zero power testing requirements,
transportation limitations, and launch site assembly limitations. This study
did not investigate possible configurations. The most likely reactor
configuration delivered to the launch site would be a complete nuclear power
system ready to be mated to a payload or launch vehicle as required. Handling
of the reactor at the launch site was assumed limited to system checkout tests
to determine any damage due to transportation from the Department of Energy to
the launch site and any checkout due to final power system assembly performed
at the launch site, e.g., dry run mating checks, physically and electrically
mating the reactor with any balance of the power system not attached,
component checkout after mating, and final loading into the launch vehicle
payload bay. Checkout of the primary heat transfer loop would likely be
performed at a Department of Energy facility where the majority, if not all,
of the power system was assembled. It is doubtful that a significant amount
of power system assembly would be performed at the launch site. At all other
times, the reactor would be in the launch site storage facility. Ground
handling at the launch site will require the use of transport systems and lift
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cranes. Access control would be provided through physical barriers and
procedures.
Launch to Low Earth Orbit
Boost to low earth orbit will be accomplished by either of three launch
vehicles, the current space shuttle, a heavy-lift derivative of the space
shuttle, or an advanced launch systems (ALS) vehicle. Since the launch
sequences are slightly different between the space shuttle types and the ALS,
two mission profiles have been defined for this phase. The profiles for this
phase are shown in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 for the ALS vehicle and the space
shuttle-type vehicle, respectively. This phase of the mission is the same as
missions previously studied during the Galileo/Ulysses (Ref. V-2), DIPS (Ref.
V-3), and SP-IO0 programs (Refs. V-4 and V-5) and will be discussed only
briefly since safety assessments have been performed as part of these
programs. The phase begins with either liftoff of a liquid-propellant-fueled-
only launch vehicle or the ignition of the solid rocket motors and ends with
either the separation of the payload from the ALS vehicle or the opening of
the shuttle-type vehicle payload bay doors. These launch and ascent sequences
have been extensively defined for the Galileo and SP-IO0 programs and the same
sequences are assumed here.
An upper stage was assumed. Initial crew flights may involve partially
fueled excursion vehicles. For later flights when the excursion vehicles
would be reused, this will not be the case. It was assumed that any launch of
an excursion vehicle in the reusable mode would be without propellants. Cargo
flights will launch the propellants separately from the excursion and transfer
vehicles. Launch configurations for shuttle-derivative vehicles will require
the reactor to be located at an elevation occupied by a portion of the solid
rocket boosters, see Figure 3-2. The launch configuration for an ALS boost to
low earth orbit will have the reactor above the boosters.
The usual convention is to break this mission phase into additional
phases. For a shuttle launch, this means the following phases: launch (prior
to liftoff), stage ] ascent (from liftoff until the boosters are jettisoned),
and stage 2 ascent (after booster jettison until Orbital Maneuvering System
burn number 1) (Ref. V-2). For an unmanned launch vehicle, this results in
the mission phases launch (from liftoff to booster jettison) and ascent
(liquid stage burns including any upper stage) (Ref. V-3). For purposes of
this study, these phases have been lumped into one with the intention of
minimizing the repetition of extensively published results of past safety
studies (Refs. V-2, V-3, V-4, and V-5). Results pertinent to this study will
be summarized and included for completeness.
Direct launch to the moon would involve transport vehicle(s) fueled at
launch. The anticipated launch vehicle is either a shuttle-derivative or ALS
booster. The events for this mission phase would be the same as those listed
in Tables 5-3 and 5-4.
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Tabl e 5-3
Advanced Launch System Launch Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
]2
13
Liftoff
Clear tower
Roll maneuver
Pitchover maneuver
Staging sequence command
Stage I ignition
Booster separation
Payload fairing unlatch and jettison
Staging sequence command
Stage I separation
Stage II ignition
Staging sequence command
Stage II retrofire and separation
Table 5-4
Shuttle-derlvative Vehicle Launch Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
!
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Solid rocket booster ignition
Liftoff
Clear tower
Roll maneuver
Pitchover maneuver
Staging sequence command
Solid rocket booster separation
Main engine cutoff
External tank jettison
Orbital Maneuvering System first burn
Coast
Orbital Maneuvering System second burn
Payload bay doors open
Low Earth Orbit Space Vehicle Assembly
The mission profile for this phase of the lunar mission depends upon the
launch vehicle. It was assumed that the space shuttle or a derivative would
be capable of delivering the payload to the assembly point without assistance.
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A space tug or an upper stage was assumed to be required to deliver the ALS
payload. The resulting profiles are shown below in Tables 5-5 and 5-6 for the
ALS and the shuttle-derivative, respectively. The payload has been assumed
separated from the ALS.
Table 5-5
Mission Phase Low Earth Orbit Space Vehtcle
Assembly Activities (ALS)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
8
Space tug dock with payload, if used
Space tug/upper stage maneuver and
first burn
Space tug/upper stage final burn
Release from space tug/upper stage
Inspection for damage
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle assembly, if required
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle fueling, if required
Attach cargo to lunar transfer vehicle
Table 5-6
Mission Phase Low Earth Orbit Space Vehtcle
Assembly Activities (Shuttle-Derivative)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
]
2
3
4
5
6
Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering
System burns
Remove payload from shuttle bay
Inspection for damage
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle assembly, if required
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle fueling, if required
Attach cargo to lunar transfer vehicle
All propulsion is assumed by means of cryogenic propellants with two
burns required. Low thrust engines will be used for maneuvering. Either a
space tug (e.g., Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle) will dock with the ALS payload
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and deliver it to the assembly point or an upper stage will be used. The
payload in the shuttle bay will be removed at the assembly point. The space
tug will be remotely controlled. The orbit lifetime for the payload will be
short for purposes of safety assessment, i.e., a failure resulting in the
payload stranded in orbit will lead to reentry.
The post-launch inspection of the power system will likely be performed
in parallel with the many other lunar transfer vehicle assembly and
maintenance operations. The activities in this phase are those which begin
after the cargo has been separated from the launch vehicle and end with the
completion of the assembly of the lunar transfer vehicle with lunar cargo.
Major activities include the assembly/refurbishment of the aerobrake,
maintenance of the propulsion system, and attachment of the fuel tanks and
cargo. Propellants are L02 and LH2. It was assumed the fuel tanks would be
attached to the lunar transfer vehicle prior to the cargo based upon Figure 3-
4. The sequence of events may mirror those on the ground where fueling is
last. Flights to the moon with the lunar excursion vehicle in the reusable
mode would require the cargo be attached to the lunar transfer vehicle and not
the excursion vehicle. There is the possibility early in the initiative that
cargo may be launched attached to the lunar excursion vehicle.
Assembly of the transportation vehicles may occur at Space Station
Freedom should the mission of the space station be expanded in the future.
The mission profiles may be as shown in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 for an ALS and a
shuttle-derivative launch vehicle, respectively. Assembly at the space
Table 5-7
Ntsston Phase Dock with Space Station After
AL$ Launch Activities (option)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
]0
Space tug dock with payload
Space tug maneuver and first burn
Space tug final burn
Dock with Space Station Freedom
Disassemble payload and attach to
space station as required
Inspection for damage
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle assembly, if required
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle fueling, if required
Detach cargo from space station, if
required
Attach cargo to lunar transfer vehicle
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Table 5-8
Mtsston Phase Dock with Space Statton after
Shuttle Launch Activities (option)
Sequence
1
8
9
Mission Phase Activities
Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering
System burns
Shuttle dock with Space Station Freedom
Remove payload from shuttle bay
Attach payload to Space Station Freedom
Inspection for damage
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle assembly, if required
Lunar transfer vehicle and lunar
excursion vehicle fueling, if required
Detach cargo from space station, if
required
Attach cargo to lunar transfer vehicle
station would result in essentially the same activities as for space vehicle
assembly in low earth orbit with the exception of the detachment of the cargo
from the space station. The potential exists for a direct launch to the moon
was defined as shown in Table 5-9. The use of a single transportation vehicle
would not involve the transfer of cargo at either the low earth orbit assembly
point or the space station.
Table 5-9
Mission Phase Direct Launch to Moon (option)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
I
2
3
4
5
Separate from launch vehicle
Maneuver for trans-lunar orbit
insertion
Lunar transport vehicle burn
Jettison empty propellant tanks
Coast to lunar orbit insertion
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Trans-Lunar Orbit Insertion
The activities during this mission phase are shown in Table 5-10. The
Table 5-10
Trans-Lunar Orbit Insertion From Low Earth Orbit
Space Vehicle Assembly Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
Maneuver for orbit insertion
Transfer vehicle engine burn
Empty propellant tanks jettisoned
activities begin with the initial maneuvering prior to the thrusting required
for insertion into the trans-lunar orbit. After the burn, the emptied lunar
transfer vehicle propellant tanks are jettisoned. Flight is by an automated
control sequence. Propellants are LO2 and LH2.
If the space station assembly option is exercised, this mission phase
would begin with a space tug maneuvering to dock with the assembled lunar
transfer vehicle, with or without the lunar excursion vehicle, see Table 5-]1.
Table 5-11
Trans-Lunar Orbit Insertion From Space Station
Freedom Ntsston Phase Activities (option)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Separation from Space Station Freedom
Dock with space tug
Space tug maneuver and first burn
Space tug final burn
Release from space tug
Maneuver for orbit insertion
Transfer vehicle engine burn
Empty propellant tanks jettisoned
The space tug docks with the lunar transfer vehicle, thrusts to separate the
lunar transfer vehicle from the space station in conjunction with the release
of the transfer vehicle by the space station, and subsequently maneuvers to
place the transfer vehicle in an orbital configuration for insertion into the
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trans-lunar orbit. The space tug undocks and returns to the space station
prior to the lunar transfer vehicle engine burn for trans-lunar orbit
insertion and empty propellant tank jettison.
Lunar Orbit Insertion
After coasting in the trans-lunar orbit, the lunar transfer vehicle
would maneuver to provide the proper thrust vector for lunar orbit insertion.
The LH2 and L02 fueled engines would fire until the lunar transfer vehicle is
in lunar orbit. The empty lunar transfer vehicle propellant tanks would then
be jettisoned. As with the tanks jettisoned in the previous phase, the
trajectories of the expelled tanks must be defined to assure they will not
become hazards to the reactor. The activity sequence is shown in Table 5-12.
An automated control system will be used with astronaut override.
Table 5-12
Lunar Orbit Insertion Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
Maneuver for orbit insertion
Lunar transfer vehicle engine burn
Empty propellant tanks jettisoned
Rendezvous with Lunar Excursion Vehicle
In this mission phase, the lunar excursion vehicle will approach the
lunar transfer vehicle for docking. The transfer of cargo will be provided by
an automated system on the lunar excursion vehicle or the lunar transfer
vehicle. Cargo will be unlocked from the transfer vehicle, pulled or pushed
to the excursion vehicle, and locked into place on the excursion vehicle. A
typical cargo transfer system may be as shown in Figure 5-I. Initial flights
will not require this sequence since the cargo will already be attached to the
excursion vehicle launched with the transfer vehicle and mated at Space
Station Freedom or in low earth orbit. LH2 will then be transferred from the
transfer vehicle to the excursion vehicle. L02 is assumed provided from
mining operations on the lunar surface. Until lunar mining of L02 is
producing the necessary quantities, early flights will require the lunar
transfer vehicle provide L02 for the excursion vehicle. Also, prior to the
permanent habitation of the lunar base and the decision to reuse excursion
vehicles, flights will arrive with the transfer and excursion vehicles mated
and the excursion vehicle fueled. At this time, the excursion and transfer
vehicles will be flown in an expendable mode. Subsequent to fueling, the
excursion vehicle will undock from the transfer vehicle and maneuver away from
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the transfer vehicle for the descent to the lunar surface. This sequence of
events are shown in Table 5-13. An automated control system was assumed.
Table 5-13
Rendezvous with Lunar Excursion Vehicle Mtsston Phase
Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
2
3
4
Lunar transfer vehicle maneuver for
docking with excursion vehicle, if
required
Lunar transfer vehicle dock with lunar
excursion vehicle, if required
Transfer cargo and LH2/L02, if required
Separation of lunar transfer and
excursion vehicles
Descent to Lunar Surface
Descent to the lunar surface will be accomplished using the lunar
excursion vehicle LO2 and LH2 engines with automated control. The engines
will burn until touchdown. The burn sequence will involve two burns like any
other orbit transfer. The sequence is shown in Table 5-]4. The landing area
will not be prepared in the early flights. Sequence 5 represents any
maneuvering just prior to touchdown. A mission profile for direct descent to
the lunar surface was defined as shown in Table 5-15. A single vehicle would
not involve the separation of the LTV and the LEV.
Emplacement
The reactor will be either be placed in an excavation, shielded by a
berm, or left on the surface, or some combination of these options. For
purposes of this study, a reference sequence for emplacement by placement in
an excavation or berm was defined as shown in Table 5-16. This sequence of
events represents operation subsequent to the arrival of the lunar excursion
vehicle payload unloader (LEVPU) on the lunar surface and with the presence of
astronauts. After inspection and connection of telemetry, the cargo will be
secured by the LEVPU and detached from the lunar excursion vehicle. The LEVPU
will then lift the cargo from the lunar excursion vehicle and transport it to
a site near the launch pad for temporary storage. The reactor will be stored
temporarily as required. The reactor will be inspected prior to transport to
the excavation site. At the excavation site the reactor will be lowered into
the excavation. If an upper shield is required to cover the excavation, it
will be attached at this tim_. Th_ power conversion system will be assembled
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Table 5-14
Descent to Lunar Surface Mission Phase Activities
(Post-LTV/LEV Rendezvous)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
1
2
3
4
S
Maneuver for descent burn
Ignite lunar excursion vehicle engines
(two burns)
Descent maneuvering
Touchdown on lunar surface
Lunar excursion vehicle engine cutoff
Table 5-15
Descent to Lunar Surface Misston Phase Activities
(direct descent)
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
Separation of lunar transfer and excursion
vehicles as required
Maneuver for descent burn
Ignite lunar excursion vehicle descent
engines (both burns)
Descent maneuvering
Touchdown on lunar surface
Lunar excursion vehicle engine cutoff
as required. The activities required for assembly were not defined in detail
due to the absence of a final system design. The reactor assembly was assumed
to require connection to the power conversion subsystem, connection of the
reactor instrumentation and control circuitry, and connection of the auxiliary
power supply. These activities would be supplemented with inspections and
subsystem and component testing. Testing at this time was assumed to be
limited to devices that are driven by electrical power and do not involve a
critical reactor configuration. System tests would be performed subsequent to
startup following power system assembly. A radiation survey would be
performed prior to continuous full power operation to verify analytical
estimates of the radiation field emanating from the reactor used for shielding
design.
S]
Table 5-16
Emplacement tn an Excavation and/or Behtnd a Berm
Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
8
10
1]
12
13
Inspection for damage
Connect telemetry to surface transport
vehicle (LEVPU, other?)
Offload from LEV
Transport to temporary storage, if
required
Inspection damage
Transport to excavation
Lower into excavation, configure and
inspect for damage and contamination
Connect to power conversion subsystem
and inspect
Connect reactor instrumentation and
control as required and inspect
Connect to startup power source, if
required
Startup
Test
Radiation survey
Emplacement on the surface of the moon was assumed to involve the
activities shown in Table 5-17. This list of activities would be different
should the nuclear power system land on the moon at the location where it will
be operated without removal from a lunar lander. In this case, there will
likely be a visual inspection for damage followed by any assembly required and
connection to the power grid, or directly to the application. The commands
for deployment and startup would then be issued. Startup tests and a
radiation survey would then be performed prior to full power operation. The
number of activities will be reduced if the system is self-contained and only
requires connection to the power grid followed by deploy and startup commands.
Surface emplacement will require distance or lunar soil to attenuate the
radiation from the reactor to meet the radiation dose requirements of Chapter
4. Placement of the power system inside a crater or excavation will allow the
reactor to be placed closer to the habitat area. Lunar soil will act as a
shield. Surface placement with line-of-site to the habitat area will require
the power system to have an integral shield or be located sufficiently far
from the habitat to meet radiation dose limitations. Operation of an
unshielded reactor is not a viable option since the large habitat-to-reactor
distances required would severely limit astronaut activities and the
additional power cable length and m_ss required would be prohibitive.
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Table 5-17
Emplacement on Surface Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
g
I0
11
12
Inspection for damage
Connect telemetry to surface transport
vehicle, as required (LEVPU, other?)
Offload from LEV, as required
Transport to application site, if
required
Inspection for damage
Connect to power conversion subsystem
and inspect, if required
Connect reactor instrumentation and
control as required and inspect, as
required
Connect to startup power system, if
required
Erect radiation zone barrier, if
required
Startup
Test
Radiation survey
Qperation and Maintenance
The operation and maintenance phase of the lunar mission profile begins
after the initial power-up to full power. Mission phase activities are shown
in Table 5-18. The sequence may be repeated many times prior to the
conclusion of this mission phase.
Astronaut interaction with the reactor would be limited to maintenance
and control supervision if an active load following strategy is adopted.
Astronauts would be involved in the maintenance and repair of non-nuclear
equipment as allowed by the design and working conditions. Maintenance and
repair may involve astronauts in the power production area, in the vicinity of
the reactor. Whether the reactor must be shutdown for repairs to the power
genera_ifn Systemwill depen_ upon the shielding design and the nature of the
Failure. Access to restricted areas near the reactor will have to be
precluded by some physical or administrative means, e.g., fence, warning
beacon, and permissible travel lanes.
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Table 5-18
Operation and Maintenance Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
Operate at constant power or active
load following
Shutdown
Maintenance
Astronaut activities at site
Startup
Test
Power up
Disposal
Disposal alternatives for the reactor at end-of-life will depend upon
detailed evaluations of disposal strategies. Three strategies have been
defined: I) disposal in place on the moon, 2) disposal away from the power
production area, and 3) insertion into a parabolic orbit. The mission phase
profiles are shown in Tables 5-19 through 5-21.
All alternatives begin with the final shutdown of the reactor. After
shutdown, auxiliary power is supplied to the power system to monitor the
status of the reactor while astronauts perform any necessary activities
associated with disconnection of the bus to the reactor control system to
permanently shutdown the reactor. This auxiliary power will also be used
while astronauts disconnect the power conversion subsystem and radiators from
the reactor if so desired. For disposal away from the power production area,
the used reactor would remain in place for fission product decay if this is
necessary. After a sufficient period of time t_ red_ radiation to safe
levels, the reactor would be encased in a shielded cask for transport away
from the power production site. The reactor would be hauled by an .......
unpressurized mannedZrob6ticrover On a transport cart tot he Bisp_sla_isite or
the launch pad. These operations, plus h_ng at the d_spos_ site and the
launch pad, Were assumed to require min_m-al-as_onaut=inVO1Veme_n_--_y_i!!i!_!_i!
dlsposal by buria_may require a _cay_h_eat _rem-ova_sy_em -unless the_reactor
can lose decay heat Sufficiently inLplace prior to Burial.....Burlal may be _
delayed until years after final shutdown if desired.
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Table 5-1g
Otsposal in Place Storage Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
5
Shutdown
Provide post-shutdown power
Disconnect reactor control system power
Disconnect reactor from power conversion
system and radiators if desired
Restrict access to site
Table 5-20
Disposal on Moon Away From Power Production Area
Mission Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
7
8
9
Shutdown
Provide post-shutdown power for reactor
Disconnect reactor control system power
Disconnect reactor from power conversion
system and radiators if allowable
Allow radioactivity to decay, if required
Remove reactor from excavation as
required
Transport reactor to disposal site
Bury reactor or leave on surface
Restrict access to disposal site
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Table 5-21
Disposal by Parabolic Trajectory Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Shutdown
Provide post-shutdown power for reactor
Disconnect reactor control system power
Disconnect reactor from power conversion
system and radiators if allowable
Allow radioactivity to decay
Remove reactor from excavation as
required
Transport reactor to launch site
Mate with booster if necessary
Load reactor onto excursion vehicle
Launch to orbit
Offload reactor and booster from
excursion vehicle (if mated on moon)
Mate reactor with booster if not
already
Maneuver for parabolic orbit insertion
Booster engine burn
5.2 IIART IAN OUTPOST
The top-level definition of the mission profile for a martian flight has
been defined as shown in Table 5-22. This closely follows martian mission
sequences defined by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in
References llI-] and V-I. Figure 3-5 contains a drawing of a typical martian
flight profile, Figure 3-6 for nuclear electric propulsion. The following
text in this section will present a more detailed description of the above
phases in the martian mission profile.
Pre-IBunch
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the lunar Pre-launch
mission phase.
Launch to Low Earth Orbit
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the corresponding lunar
mission phase with the exceptions that I) the nuclear reactor power system
will be launched on expendable launch vehicles with the _artian transfer and
excursion vehicles and 2) the expendable launch vehicle n,ay use solid ,'ocket
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Misston
Phase
Table 5-22
Martian Mission Profile
Mission Activity
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pre-launch
Launch to low earth orbit
Low earth orbit space vehicle
assembly operations
Trans-Mars orbit insertion
Mars orbit insertion
MTV and MEV rendezvous
Descent to surface of Mars
Emplacement
Operation and maintenance
Disposal
boosters. Figure 3-7 shows the martian mission launch vehicle options.
Low Earth Orbit Space Vehicle Assembly
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the lunar Low Earth Orbit
Space Vehicle Assembly mission phase for the case where an expendable launch
vehicle is used. There is the possibility that the nuclear reactor power
system will be launched attached to the martian excursion vehicle in a
configuration suitable for the flight to Mars.
Aerobrake(s), if used, will be assembled on the excursion vehicle(s) and
the excursion vehicle(s) will be fueled as well as the transfer vehicle.
Reference Ill-] is not clear as to the use of martian excursion vehicles in a
reusable mode. The lunar mission profile was assumed to apply. Regardless,
propellants for the martian excursion vehicle(s) will likely originate from
the earth or the moon, the assumption taken here.
Trans-Mars Orbit Insertion
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission was assumed to be the same as the lunar mission Trans-Lunar
Orbit Insertion mission phase. Figures 3-8 and 3-9 illustrate the proposed
martian transfer and excursion vehicles with Figure 3-8 showing an expected
flight configuration. The exceptions are: 1) the possibility of nuclear
electric propulsion may eliminate LO2, 2) all vehicles are fully fueled, 3)
the excursion vehicle(s) are always present, and 4) the flight path for
nuclear electric propulsion may contain a flyby of the moon to gain energy in
a gravity assist maneuver, see Figure 3-6.
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Mars Orbit Insertion and MTV/M{V Rendezvous
The Mars Orbit Insertion flight profile is significantly different from
the Lunar Orbit Insertion profile due to the separation of the transfer and
excursion vehicles and the use of aerobrakes to shed energy. The activities
for this mission phase are shown in Table 5-23. Prior to orbit insertion by
aerobrake, the transfer and excursion vehicles are separated from the
configuration as shown in Figure 3-8. The vehicles separately shed energy by
an automated system until achieving the proper orbit. Subsequently, the
vehicles rendezvous with the astronauts leaving the crew module of the
transfer vehicle for the excursion vehicle crew module. Descent to the
martian surface is then preceded by separation of the transfer and excursion
vehicles. No cargo transfer from the transfer vehicle to the excursion
Table 5-23
Mars Orbit Insertion Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
2
3
4
5
6
7
Separation of transfer and excursion
vehicles
Maneuver for aerobraking
Aerobrake into orbit
Maneuver for rendezvous
Transfer and excursion vehicle dock
Crew transfer to excursion vehicle
Separation of transfer and excursion
vehicles
vehicle was assumed, i.e., the cargo was assumed attached to the excursion
vehicle at the vehicle assembly point in low earth orbit, or Space Station
Freedom. This phase would be unnecessary for cargo missions since the
excursion vehicles could descend directly to the surface of Mars.
The use of nuclear propulsion would greatly affect this phase of the
mission. Orbit insertion would be accomplished by rocket engine burn. A
short burn near Mars was assumed for a nuclear thermal propulsion system. A
nuclear electric propulsion system was assumed to have been operated
constantly since insertion into the trans-Mars orbit except for vehicle
rotation at mid-course. If constant thrusting is not the case, the electric
thrusters will, however, be ignited far from Mars in any case. The
significance of this point is the long lead time available for corrective
action after failure of the nuclear electric propulsion system.
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DesqQn_ to Surf_c_ oF Mars
Descent to the surface of Mars is significantly different than descent
to the lunar surface. This phase of the martian flight begins with a maneuver
for descent and ends with engine cutoff after landing. The profile is shown
in Table 5-24. The aerobrake is used initially to shed orbital energy but is
Table 5-24
Descent to Surface of Xars gtssion Phase Activities
Sequence Mission Phase Activities
I
2
3
4
5
6
Maneuver for descent
Aerobrake
Jettison aerobrake
Descent engine ignition
Touchdown
Descent engine cutoff
jettisoned prior to ignition of the descent engine(s). The conditions under
which the aerobrake is jettisoned are unknown at this time. A chemical or
nuclear propulsion descent system may be an option. Shielding requirements
may preclude the use of a nuclear system for manned flight. A nuclear descent
stage would require a 4_ shield to allow astronauts mobility on the surface.
Descent was assumed to be controlled by an automated system.
[mplacement
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the corresponding lunar
mission phase.
Operation and Maintenanc_
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the corresponding lunar
mission phase.
Disposal
For the purposes of this study, the profile for this phase of the
martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the corresponding lunar
mission phase.
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6.0 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Potential accidents for each phase of the lunar and martian mission
profiles defined in Chapter 5 have been identified. Accident descriptions and
characterization were qualitative only. There was no data available due to
the conceptual nature of the launch vehicles and the lack of a specific
nuclear reactor power system design for the moon and Mars. Nuclear reactor
designs for the moon and Mars were assumed to be basically similar to SP-]O0.
Simplified event trees have been constructed for each mission phase as
an aid to postulating reactor response to accidents. The accident scenarios
and simplified event trees have been defined and constructed without regard to
the safety design features implemented in the SP-IO0 program to preclude
overlooking a new safety issue resulting from the differences in SP-]O0
missions and the SEI missions. The effects of the SP-IO0 program safety
features will be assessed in chapter 8. Multiple use of a part of a tree does
not mean consequences of the same magnitude nor that the events represented by
the same descriptor are exactly identical. For example, the shipping
accidents on route to reactor assembly and on route to the testing facility in
Figure 6-] represent events with individual fuel rods and an assembled
reactor. A ruptured shipping container would potentially lead to either fuel
rods in a critical configuration or damage to the reactor to result in a
critical configuration. A critical configuration was assumed possible only
after extensive damage to the shipping container, i.e., rupture of the
container. A critical configuration was assumed to result in an excursion and
the release of fission products. The trees were constructed in an abbreviated
form with sufficient information to identify potential hazards. The accidents
and simplified event trees were defined to be comprehensive to preclude design
and procedure change suggestions that would potentially solve one safety issue
and re-introduce another without notice.
A small discussion is presented at this point to place in perspective
the following accident scenario descriptions. These descriptions are part of
a radiological risk assessment process required for launch approval of a
nuclear power source. Mission risk is assessed by probabilistic risk analysis
techniques. The end product of the analyses is a quantitative assessment of
the potential for human exposure to radiation levels above natural background
as a result of the use of nuclear power sources in a space application. The
analysis begins with the determination of mission events which have the
potential to expose humans to radiation. Occurrence probabilities are then
determined. Next, the consequences of these events are defined in terms of
human exposure to radiation at various levels. Finally, the nuclear power
system is evaluated on the basis of these analyses.
Accident scenarios are defined as part of the determination of mission
events which have the potential to expose humans to radiation. For a
particular mission, mission phases aredefined to allow the systematic
evaluation of normal procedures and mission events to determine the results of
an abnormal event. This is followed by an analysis of aborts or failure modes
for each mission phase to identify potential malfunctions, single or multiple,
which can potentially affect the nuclear power source. For each of the
malfunctions, subsequent nuclear power source environments and associated
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occurrence probabilities are defined. These environments are then sequenced
in an event tree. This is followed by an assessment Of the response of the
nuclear power system to each of the adverse environments, e.g., launch pad
explosion overpressure and fragment field. If the analysis indicates a
potential for the uncontrolled exposure of humans to radiation, a radiation
source term is defined. The state and location of the radiation source term
is considered. When the source terms with associated probabilities have been
defined, the human consequences of the source terms are analyzed by
characterizing environmental dispersion and human uptake. The combination of
the source term probabilities and the potential human uptake is then used to
describe the mission risk.
The simplified event trees described in this chapter do not include the
occurrence probabilities mentioned above. They are not detailed in that
events of similar type but not necessarily the same consequence or probability
have been combined. Nuclear system responses have been defined based upon
similar accidents evaluated in previous safety analyses. The responses are
the result of a cursory evaluation. No attempt has been made to estimate
occurrence probabilities. The intent was to use the event trees to identify
safety issues and not to discount any of them. Events which have catastrophic
consequences for the nuclear power system may have extremely small occurrence
probabilities making the event an insignificant contributor to mission risk.
A new safety issue identified in this study should not impact design until
occurrence probabilities, system response, and dispersion in the environment
have been determined.
6.1 LUNAR OUTPOST
Prelaunch
Potential accidents for this mission phase are listed in Table 6-1. As
noted in chapter 5, this mission phase ends prior to the ignition of the
liquid engines. Also listed are the resulting accident environments. The
accidents and environments subsequent to the receipt of the reactor at the
launch site have been thoroughly examined in the Galileo/Ulysses (Ref. V-2),
DIPS (Ref. V-3) and SP-IO0 (Refs. V-4 and V-S) programs. A few accidents
prior to transportation of the reactor to the launch site have been included,
e.g., zero power test control failure and beryllium release during
fabrication.
For this mission phase, the corresponding simplified event tree can be
found in Figure 6-1. It was assumed that a damaged reactor has the potential
for an excursion due to the resulting configuration. At a minimum, a damaged
reactor was assumed to release fuel without an excursion required due to fuel
pin damage. A more detailed safety assessment is required to define degrees
of damage. All impacts were assumed to have the potential for damage to the
reactor. A reactor control failure during zero power testing was assumed to
result in a runaway reaction leading to fuel pin failure. A decay heat
removal failure during zero power testing was assumed to lead to excessive
clad temperatures and fuel pin failure. An inadvertent reactor startup due to
a spurious or inadvertent signal was assumed possible without a method to
preclude such an occurrence. An inadvertent reactor startup was assumed to
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Table 6-1
Lunar Nisston Prelaunch Phase Accidents and Resulting Nuclear
Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Drop reactor or fuel rod
Traffic accident
Zero power test control failure
Inadvertent reactor startup
Collision
Fire in storage facility
LOJLH2 tank failure
Aft compartment explosion
(Shuttle-derivative)
Failure of a liquid propellant
rocket motor leading to an
explosion
Beryllium release during machining
Impact
Impact
Water submersion
Excursion
N/A
Impact
Fire
Overpressure
Shrapnel
Fire
Overpressure
Shrapnel
Fire
Overpressure
Shrapnel
Fire
N/A
provide a radiation field harmful to nearby personnel.
Launch )0 Low Earth Orbi)
The accidents and resulting environments for this mission phase have
been extensively studied during the Galileo/Ulysses (Ref. V-2), DIPS (Ref. V-
3) and 5P-I00 (Refs. V-4 and V-5) programs for both the space shuttle and
expendable launch vehicles (Titan}. Accidents will be initiated from either a
failure of the launch vehicle or the nuclear reactor structure to resist
launch loads inside the payload bay. The nuclear reactor will be subject to
impact, fire, overpressure, projectiles, and reentry. The potential exists
for inadvertent reactor startup.
Simplified event trees for the launch vehicle options shuttle-derivative
and Advanced Launch System (ALS) are shown in Figures 6-2 and 6-3,
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respectively. For clarification, the descriptor "Fire" represents the
condition where a reactor may reach a critical configuration due to the
thermal environment produced by burning fuel on the ground near the launch
pad. No subsequent events take place. A fireball was assumed to not
significantly damage the reactor in flight, i.e., the "No Fire" event. The
condition of the reactor on the ground for the "Fire" event was not defined.
In any case, there would either be fuel, and possibly fission products,
released or not. Characterization of events in this mission phase was
minimized since the SP-]O0 program has studied this phase in great detail.
Sufficient detail has been included to determine that the current missions to
the moon and Mars will not introduce new safety issues.
Low Earth Orbit Space Vehicle Assembly
Potential accidents are listed in Table 6-2. This mission phase has
been divided into two sub-phases: I) insertion into low earth orbit from
launch and 2) assembly operations. Table 6-2 covers the first sub-phase. Low
earth orbit insertion was assumed to require the shuttle Orbit Maneuvering
System or an upper stage of the launch vehicle. Even though a space tug has
been included in the analysis, a space tug will not likely be used since it
would require a base for support which would be missing. The possibility does
exist that an expendable space tug may be used and discarded after assembly of
the transport system. Space tug failures would include an explosion of the
propulsion system, engines and tanks, and guidance errors leading to orbits
which will decay. Similar accidents are possible for cargo launched on a
space shuttle-type vehicle where the Orbital Maneuvering System fails by
explosion or guidance error. Any time during this phase, an inadvertent
reactor startup command could be issued.
Table 6-2
Lunar Mission Low Earth Orbit Space Vehicle Assembiy Phase
(LEO Insertion) Accidents and Resuitin9 Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
i : T
T
Explosion
Projectiles
Reentry
Space tug/last stage of
launch vehicle failure
Orbital Maneuvering Reentry
System failure
Assembly failure
Collision
laaCvertent reactor startup
Reentry
Impact
Reentry
Inadequate heat sink
7O
Failures of the space tug (e.g., Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle), upper
stage, and the Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System may result in
projectiles and reentry, see Figures 6-4, 6-5 and 6-6. An explosion may
result in reentry because of the relatively low altitude of the orbit. A
guidance failure may result directly in reentry. Failure of a space tug to
dock with the cargo would leave the nuclear reactor in low earth orbit.
Orbital maneuvering to place the space vehicle components in close proximity
for assembly have the potential for collisions. Collisions may occur between
the reactor and various components of the transportation vehicles as the
pieces are maneuvered for assembly. An excursion may occur whenever the
reactor is damaged, a situation similar to a launch explosion. An inability
to assemble the entire transportation system package with payload may leave
the reactor stranded in low earth orbit if the power system cannot be
recovered. Reentry may occur if the orbit has a short life and the reactor
altitude cannot be maintained prior to a rescue mission. An inadvertent
reactor startup command may find the reactor generating heat with the heat
rejection subsystem not deployed or unable to reject heat to space because the
power system is inside a payload fairing or other container. In this case,
the reactor would not have an adequate heat sink which to reject heat. The
fuel and fission products generated would be released if fuel clad failure
occurred. Otherwise, the fission products would act as a radiation source
during reentry and earth impact. Also, an unshielded reactor, i.e., the
reactor design requires lunar regolith for shielding during operation, may
produce a hazardous radiation field for any astronauts in the vicinity.
Operations in low earth orbit will include the handling of propellant
tanks with large quantities of L02 and LH2. Overpressurization of a
propellant tank, if fuel transfer is required, or a collision during the
process of attaching the fuel tanks to the transfer and/or excursion vehicles,
may result in tank failure as indicated in Table 6-3. A considerable amount
of activity will involve moving pieces of transfer vehicle components, e.g.,
aerobrake and propellant tanks, and cargo from temporary storage positions to
the mission vehicle assembly area. This movement of material has the
potential for a collision with the nuclear reactor power system. Inadvertent
startup of the reactor is also a potential accident during this mission phase.
A propellant tank rupture due to the explosion of an unsuccessful
fueling of the lunar transfer vehicle (LTV) and the lunar excursion vehicle
(LEV) would produce a field of projectiles. These projectiles may separate
the nuclear power system from the space station or the transfer/excurslon
vehicle. Astronaut retrieval may follow, assuming the reactor configuration
subsequent to the accident was subcritical. A critical reactor configuration
was assumed to lead to an excursion and/or fuel release. A collision of the
nuclear power system and the various pieces of the transfer and excursion
vehicles moved about during assembly would likely result in low speed impact
without an excursion and possibly, reentry if the impact dislodges the reactor
and it cannot be recovered. Depending upon the power system design, an
inadvertent startup would result in the reactor overheating since the heat
rejection subsystem would not be deployed or the reactor would not be integral
with the rest of the power system. Another serious concern would be the
exposure of astronauts to the radiation field generated by the reactor. If
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the lunar emplacement scheme is to shield the reactor with lunar materials,
operation at this time would subject astronauts to an inadequately shielded
neutron flux.
Table 6-3
Lunar Ntsston Low Earth Orbtt Space Vehicle Assmbly Phase
(Operations) Accidents and Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Propellant tank failure
during LTV/LEV fueling
Explosion
Projectiles
Reentry
Collision Impact
Reentry
Inadvertent reactor startup Inadequate heat sink
An option for this mission phase is the assembly of the space vehicle at
Space Station Freedom, Figures 6-7 and 6-8. The potential accidents for this
option are much the same as for assembly of the space vehicle in low earth
orbit. The major exception is the maneuvers used to dock with the space
station. They will replace the maneuvers in low earth orbit to place the
various components of the payload and transportation system in close proximity
for assembly. Failure to dock may occur when the space tug attaches to the
cargo which has been boosted by an expendable launch vehicle or when the space
tug and cargo or shuttle attempts to dock with Space Station Freedom. For
this mission phase, the assumption was made that the space tug would not dock
with the space station but the cargo would be directly attached to the space
station. The space tug would then separate from the cargo after confirmation
of cargo attachment to the space station. During any of these docking
maneuvers, a collision between the cargo and the space tug and/or space
station may occur. If the cargo and space tug are unable to dock with the
space station, an alternate procedure would have to be used to retrieve the
cargo. A similar situation may occur if the space shuttle would fail to dock
with the space station or the space tug would fail to separate from the cargo
after docking with the space station. A collision may result in impact with
the space tug, the space shuttle, or the space station structure.
Representative accidents for this option are listed in Table 6-4.
The potential accidents for operations at the space station would be
quite similar as those for space vehicle assembly in low earth orbit, see
Table 6-3, but with the addition of potential collisions of the reactor and
propellant tanks with the space station. There will still be the potential
for collisions between the reactor and elements of the transportation system.
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Table 6-4
Lunar Mission Dock With Space Station Freedom Phase
Accidents and Resulting Reactor Environments
(optton)
Accident Reactor Environment
Space tug failure
Orbital Maneuvering
System failure
Docking failure
Collision
Inadvertent reactor startup
Explosion
Projectiles
Reentry
Expl osion
Projectiles
Reentry
Reentry
Impact
Reentry
Inadequate heat sink
The corresponding simplified event tree is also shown in Figure 6-6.
A direct launch to the moon would not involve any assembly operations in
low earth orbit. Because of this, the accidents would be limited to
inadvertent reactor startup and failure of the lunar transfer vehicle to
insert the payload into the trans-lunar orbit, see Figure 6-9. The resultant
possible reactor environments may be an inadequate heat sink, an explosion,
projectiles, and reentry to earth if the resultant trajectory passes too close
to the atmosphere.
Trans-Lunar Orbi_ Insertion
Potential accidents during this phase include a collision of the
transfer vehicle and cargo with Space Station Freedom after separation, Table
6-5. Orbit insertion from low earth orbit not at the space station would not
have the potential for collision with the space tug used to undock the lunar
transportation system from the space station. Also, space tug failures during
orbit maneuvers would be eliminated. The maneuvering by the space tug prior
to trans-lunar orbit insertion was assumed performed by the lunar
transportation system. Collision of the transfer vehicle and cargo and the
jettisoned propellant tanks may also occur after orbit insertion. Such a
collision was assumed to lead to an explosion, see Figure 6-10. The lunar
transfer vehicle may fail for such reasons as tank rupture, engine explosion,
engine failure to ignite or shut down, loss of thrust, or guidance error. A
failure of the exhausted propellant tanks to separate from the transfer
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Table 6-5
Trans-Lunar Orbit Insertion Phase Accidents and
Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Lunar transfer vehicle and space
tug failure
Collision with space tug
Failure of empty propellant
tank to separate
Inadvertent reactor startup
Projectiles
Reentry
Impact
Reentry
Inadequate heat sink
vehicle may be a safety problem depending upon contingency plans for such an
event. If sufficient rocket fuel is provided for lunar orbit insertion with
the empty tanks attached, there will be no safety concern. However, if the
contingency plan is to allow the transfer vehicle to return to earth without
attempting lunar orbit insertion, the possibility of earth reentry exists. An
inadvertent reactor startup command may be issued.
Collisions may lead to impact of the reactor and/or an explosion. A
failure of the transfer vehicle and the space tug may result in a projectile
field due to an explosion followed by reentry. A damaged reactor may result
in an excursion of the reactor in orbit or during reentry and impact. As
stated above, a failure to jettison an empty propellant tank(s) may result in
reentry. An operating reactor would pose a hazard to a flight crew. It was
assumed that the reactor would be sufficiently far from the space station to
not be a hazard to astronauts at the space station. An operated reactor may
pose a hazard to the public. If the reactor can be shut down, it may not pose
a significant problem. If, however, the reactor cannot be shutdown or it
operates to the point of fuel release, it will pose a hazard to astronauts if
retrieval is required and to the public if retrieval is not possible and it is
stranded in low earth orbit. This last safety problem is common to all
mission phases where the potential for reentry occurs. The reactor itself
would not be part of a fully assembled and deployed system and, hence, would
not have an adequate heat sink because it was insulated from space.
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Lunar Orbit In_r_iQn
Failures of the lunar transfer vehicle have been lumped into a single
accident in Table 6-6. Lunar transfer vehicle failures can include loss of
thrust, failure to ignite engines, engine explosion, failure of engines to
shut down, and guidance error. As usual, an inadvertent startup command may
be received.
An explosion of the lunar transfer vehicle engines may result in a field
of projectiles plus rupture of L02 and LH2 propellant tanks with additional
Table 6-6
Lunar Orbit Insertion Phase Accidents and
Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Lunar transfer vehicle failure
Inadvertent reactor startup
Explosion
Reentry
Projectiles
Impact
Inadequate heat sink
projectiles, see Figure 6-11. As noted previously, a damaged reactor may
result in fuel release and possibly, an excursion. A failure of the rocket
engine to ignite or very early loss of thrust may lead to a return to earth
and reentry if the trans-lunar orbit has a return trajectory intersecting the
earth. Improper thrust vector control may result in lunar surface impact.
Impact on the surface of the moon was assumed to result in complete
destruction of the reactor. The impact, without the benefit of an atmospheric
drag, would be at high speed, likely much greater than earth reentry terminal
speed. An inadvertently operating reactor may pose a hazard to a flight crew.
As previously discussed, the reactor would not be configured for operation and
would not have an adequate heat sink.
A direct descent to the lunar surface option would have the potential
for the same accidents as lunar orbit insertion with the exception of the
separation of the transfer and excursion vehicles if a single transportation
vehicle was not used (see Figure 6-12). If the transfer and excursion
vehicles did not separate, the transportation vehicles and payload may return
to earth on a flyby trajectory, where the earth return leg of the trans-lunar
orbit intersects the earth. An explosion of the descent vehicle during
descent may lead to fuel release or possibly an excursion with the fuel and
excursion fission products released upon impact with the lunar surface.
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Rendezvous With Lunar Ex{ursion V_hiqle
Potential accidents for this phase of the lunar mission are listed in
Table 6-7. Collisions could occur during the docking maneuver and after the
lunar transfer and excursion vehicles have separated prior to excursion
vehicle descent to the lunar surface. Failures to dock, undock, and transfer
cargo and propellants to the excursion vehicle may not immediately present
safety problems but, a procedure and the means would be required to recover
the reactor. An inadvertent reactor startup is possible.
Table 6-7
Lunar Mission Rendezvous With LEV Phase Accidents
and Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Collision
Failure to dock or undock
Failure to transfer cargo
or LHJL02
Inadvertent reactor startup
Impact
Explosion
Projectiles
Stranded in orbit
Stranded in orbit
Inadequate heat sink
A collision may result in reactor impact, an explosion, and projectiles.
Fuel may be released to orbit after a collision and explosion with an
excursion a possibility, Figure 6-13. The docking, undocking, and cargo or
L02 and LH2 transfer failures would lead to the reactor stranded in orbit.
Retrieval may or may not be practical. Propellant tank rupture due to an
unsuccessful propellant transfer from the LTV to the LEV would produce
projectile fields. An inadvertent startup of the reactor could lead to a
hazardous radiation field to a flight crew and an overheated nuclear power
system if it is unable to adequately reject heat because it is inside a
fairing or other such container.
Descent TQ Lunar Surface
Table 6-8 lists potential accidents and the resulting reactor
environments for this phase of the lunar mission. A failure of the lunar
excursion vehicle may occur due to a guidance error, a loss of thrust, a
descent engine explosion or failure to ignite or re-ignite, or an attitude
control failure upon landing. Guidance errors, loss of thrust, and attitude
92
ii
b
I
[
[
93
t
!
"2J
o=
olin
c_
OlpB
--i
Ld
IrE
Iml
!
LD
4J
ILL
Table 6-8
Descent to Lunar Surface Phase Accidents and
Resultlng Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Lunar excursion vehicle
failure
Inadvertent reactor startup
Impact
Projectiles
Stranded in orbit
Burial in regolith
Explosion
Inadequate heat sink
control failure may lead to impact on the lunar surface with fuel released as
shown in Figure 6-14. No allowance was made for mitigating circumstances in
near-surface low-speed impacts. An engine explosion would produce a field of
projectiles. A damaged reactor was assumed to release fuel with the
possibility for an excursion. The added notation /A denotes that the reactor
may also impact the surface of the moon, i.e., the accident is not over. No
ignition of the descent engines would leave the reactor stranded in orbit. An
inadvertent reactor startup would present a radiation hazard to the flight
crew. The reactor would also be unable to adequately reject heat. Subsequent
fuel cladding failure was assumed.
Direct descent to the lunar surface has been discussed previously in the
mission phase Lunar Orbit Insertion.
Emol acement
Accidents during this phase are dependent upon the emplacement scheme.
Common to the emplacement schemes are the potential accidents dropping the
reactor to the lunar surface if offloading from the lunar excursion vehicle
and/or emplacement in an excavation is required, colliding the reactor with
other cargo or the lunar excursion vehicle during offloading, inadvertent
reactor startup, reactor control failure during startup and test prior to full
power operation. Not included in the simplified event trees is the
possibility of excessive emitted radiation due to inadequate shielding
discovered during a site survey. The assumption was made that proper
engineering design resulted in adequate shielding. A summary of these
accidents for the emplacement schemes where the reactor would be emplaced in
an excavation or surrounded by a berm is shown in Table 6-9. Potential
accidents for the emplacement schemes where the reactor is left on the surface
of the moon are also shown in Table 6-9. Impact accidents will be at low
speeds.
Low _peed impBcts will result if the reactor collides with the lunar
excursion vehicl_ or i_ dropped during unloading of the reactor at the landing
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Table 6-9
Emplacement Phase Accidents and Resulting
Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Collision
Drop reactor
Control failure
Inadvertent reactor
startup
Impact
Impact
Excursion
Inadequate heat sink
site. The possibility of an excursion was included since a reactor design may
allow removal of criticality-prevention devices subsequent to arrival on the
lunar surface which were designed for high speed impacts, see Figure 6-15.
These same types of accidents may occur at the emplacement site as the reactor
is lifted from a lunar surface transport cart and lowered into an excavation
or inside a berm enclosure. The power system may require some assembly.
Subsequent to the assembly of the nuclear reactor power system, a series of
tests will be performed. Even with no assembly, startup testing will be
required. A reactor control failure during startup and testing may result in
an excursion.
A nuclear power system which turnkey would not be susceptible to most of
the accidents shown in Table 6-9 and Figure 6-15.
Operation and Maintenance
During normal operation, system failures and external events can lead to
unsafe reactor operating conditions. Depending upon the probability of the
failure or the event, a reactor may be designed to accommodate the
consequences of the failure or event. Design basis events were identified in
the SP-IO0 program. Accidents related to the failure of the safety functions
designed to accommodate these events were included in this study. Also
included as accidents were events leading to unsafe conditions to astronauts
but not necessarily to a failed power system. Examples would be an
inadvertent startup of the reactor during maintenance procedures or an
astronaut inadvertently contacting live power cables. These failures and
external events are listed as accidents in Table 6-10. It should be
recognized that at this time minimal astronaut involvement with the power
system is preferred. A turnkey power system which only requires cable hookup
will eliminate any safety concerns with respect to maintenance or repair.
Loss of the primary coolant loop fluid or just the loss of flow of the
primary coolant wil cause the, power system to be unable to remove heat as it
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Tab]e 6-10
Lunar Ntsston Operation and Hatntenance Phase Accidents
and Resulting Reactor Environments
(Sheet 1 of 2)
Accident Reactor Environment
Loss of coolant
Loss of flow
Loss of power conversion
subsystem
Loss of heat sink
Loss of load
Reactor I&C failures or
sufficiently degraded state
Reactor safety subsystem
failures including
environmental effects
Reactor safety subsystem
sufficiently degraded state
Exceed fuel temperature limits
Inadvertent startup during
maintenance
Inadequate heat
rejection path
Inadequate heat
rejection path
Inadequate heat
rejection path
Inadequate heat
rejection path
Inadequate heat
removal path
Excursion or
shutdown
Excursion or
shutdown
Excursion or
shutdown
Degraded operation
lifetime
Shutdown I
Loss of uninterruptible power
(e.g., battery)
Fuel pin failure
Loss of communications with
habitat/space station/earth
Unable to monitor
after shutdown
Fission product
release
Uncontrolled by
external command
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Table 6-10
Lunar Mission Operation and Maintenance Phase Accidents
and Resulting Reactor Environments
(Sheet 2 of 2)
Accident Reactor Environment
Excessive positive reactivity
insertion
Excursion
Unplanned negative reactivity
insertion
Power-down or
shutdown
Loss of power to buses Uncontrolled
Astronaut contact with power
cables
N/A
Meteor impact Impact
I. During maintenance the reactor will be shutdown, but
the potential exists for astronaut exposure to
harmful radiation fields.
is generated in the reactor core. If the power conversion subsystem or the
heat rejection subsystem fails to function, a scram condition will exist and
decay heat will have to be removed. A loss of load would also result in a
scram condition.
Failures in the reactor instrumentation and control and in the safety
subsystems may result in inadvertent positive or negative reactivity
insertions depending upon system design. Failures can also lead to the
inability of the system to determine that the system is operating in an unsafe
condition. Degradation of the instrumentation and control subsystem and the
safety subsystems can also result in unsafe operation.
Exceeding fuel temperature limits during operation may not result in a
hazardous condition at the moment of the event. However, reactor internal
component degradation may be sufficient to effect component and system
lifetimes. System design may no longer be adequate to meet predicted
performance levels and lifetimes.
Astronauts may have to perform maintenance activities on the nuclear
power system to meet reliability requirements. Hence, the potential exists
for astronauts to be exposed to unsafe levels of radiation due to inadvertent
operation of the reactor should these maintenance tasks require shutdown. A
highly reliable system would require not maintenance and thus, eliminate this
concern.
gg
After a shutdown command, a power supply will be required to monitor the
status of the reactor and remove decay heat. A loss of this independent power
supply may lead to reactor core disruption due to excessive temperatures. It
will certainly lead to the inability of the astronauts to determine the
condition of the reactor. A shutdown command could fail to shutdown the
reactor but trip the power conversion subsystem to the shutdown mode. Without
power to monitor the status, this condition would not be identified.
Fuel pin failure would result in the release of fission products into
the primary coolant. The deposition of the fission products in the primary
loop could lead to astronaut radiation overexposure during maintenance
operations at the power production site.
Loss of communication with the reactor will prevent control of the
reactor by external commands.
Excessive positive reactivity insertions will lead to a reactor
excursion and the destruction of the core. An unplanned negative reactivity
insertion will result in a loss of power and possibly shutdown. These events
may occur as a result of system degradation.
Loss of power to buses will result in loss of safety function and
possibly, an uncontrolled reactor.
A meteoroid impact may result in an unsafe impact environment. Meteors
typically impact at speeds from I km/sec to 72 km/sec (Ref. V-3). Damage to
the reactor may range from small punctures of a coolant loop to complete
destruction of the power system with subsequent dispersal of the reactor core
materials.
The above accidents have been lumped together into the five accidents
shown in Figure 6-16. Most of the above accidents will result in hazardous
conditions should reactor control or decay heat removal fail. Fuel cladding
failure as shown in Figure 6-16 represents fuel pin failure during normal
operation and not as a result of reactor control failure or a loss of coolant
accident. Also shown in the figure is the consequences to the habitat of a
failure of the reactor, loss of power to the habitat. Primary power to the
habitat will be lost whenever the nuclear power system is shut down.
Disposal
Three alternate fuel disposal schemes have been identified: 1) disposal
in place on the moon, 2) disposal on the moon away from the power production
area, and 3) insertion into a parabolic escape orbit. Potential accidents for
these options have been separated and are listed in tabular form.
The disposal in place option would have the reactor shut down and left
in place in the power production area. Potential accidents for this disposal
strategy are listed in Table 6-11. Failure of the reactor to shutdown at end
of life will result in reactor operation with unpredictable performance. The
reliability and effectiveness of safety systems and functions would be
unknown. Failure of the reactor system tG provide for _ermanent shutdown may
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Table 6-11
Dtsposal In Place Phase Accidents and Resulting Hazards
Accident Hazard
Failure to shutdown permanently
at end of life
Loss of decay heat removal
Unrestricted access to site
Containment failure
Micrometeor impact
Radiation to
astronaut
Release of
fission products
Radiation to
astronaut
Contamination
of regolith
Fission product
release
allow an extended period of cycles of low power reactor operation as the
fission products buildup and decay. This could result in radiation exposure
during disposal operations, see Figure 6-17. Subsequent to shutdown, decay
heat must be removed until the heat generation level has sufficiently decayed
to the point where loss of a decay heat removal system will not lead to breach
of cladding and the release of fission products.
Depending upon the emplacement scheme, the reactor may present a
radiation hazard. An emplacement scheme which uses distance for shielding
(e.g., an unshielded reactor in a crater) may require distance for shielding
of the disposed reactor. Unrestricted access to the reactor may result in
radiation overexposure to an astronaut.
The reactor will be exposed to the lunar environment for a significantly
long period of time. Containment may be breached by material failure due to
interaction with the lunar environment or due to meteor impact. Fission
products may be released.
Disposal on the moon away from the power production area may potentially
experience the accidents listed in Table 6-12. The accidents and resulting
hazards are the same as for the disposal in place option with the exception of
transportation accidents. The reactor may be dropped during handling and the
transport cart may roll over. These accidents will involve low speed impacts
which may lead to fission product release depending upon the condition of the
reactor, see Figure 6-18.
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Table 6-12
Dtsposal Away From Power Production Area Phase Accidents
and Resulting Hazards
Accident Hazard
Failure to shutdown permanently
at end of life
Radiation to
astronaut
Loss of decay heat removal Release of
fission products
Drop reactor Release of
fission products
Transport cart rollover Release of
fission products
Unrestricted access to site Radiation to
astronaut
Containment failure Contamination
of regolith
Meteor impact Fission product
release
Disposal bymeans of insertion into a parabolic escape trajectory would
involve launching the reactor by lunar excursion vehicle. Representative
accidents are_iisted in Tables 6-13 and 6-14. In addition to the accidents
common to the previous disposal strategies, accidents involving the lunar
excursion vehicle will be possible. Potential accidents associated with the
separation of the reactor with booster from the lunar excursion vehicle are
introduced. The booster will add to the lunar excursion vehicle accidents and
consequences. These additional accidents and consequences are lumped with the
lunar excursion vehicle failure and consequences because the booster was
assumed to be a similar L02 and LH2 propulsion system. Failure of the lunar
excursion vehicieand the disposal booster to separate may lead to the
decision to land the lunar excursion vehicle for repair or replacement. A
return to the lunar surface would introduce the possibility of lunar excursion
vehicle failures and reactor impact during descent. A condensed version of
the previous accident and environment table format has been used due to the
large number of possible accidents and environments.
The simplified event tree for the option to dispose by parabolic
trajectory is shown in Figure 6-19. Contrary to previous event trees, an
explosion of the lunar excursion vehicleat launch from the surface of the
105
Dtsposal
Table 6-13
by Parabolic Trajectory Phase Accidents
and Resulting Hazards
Accident Hazard
Failure to shutdown permanently
at end of life
Loss of decay heat removal
Drop reactor
Transport cart rollover
Radiation to
astronaut
Release of
fission products
Release of
fission products
Release of
fission products
Table 6-14
Disposal by Parabolic Trajectory Phase Accidents
and Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Lunar excursion vehicle failure Impact
Projectiles
Explosion
Collision after separation Impact
Explosion
Projectiles
Disposal booster failure Projectiles
Stranded in orbit
Impact
Explosion
moon was assumed to lead to fission product release regardless of whether a
reactor excursion occurred or not since the reactor had operated for its
lifetime. The consequences ofl_mpac_ing_e-s-urfaceof themoon after LEV
failure would depend on the altitude at the moment of LEV failure. As such,
allowance was made for an impact without damage to the reactor. '_
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6.2 NARTIAN OUTPOST
Pre-launch
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and nuclear power system
environments for this phase of the martian mission has been assumed to be the
same as the corresponding lunar mission phase, see section 6.1. For purposes
of brevity, the simplified event tree constructed for this mission phase has
not been included. The reader may use the corresponding simplified event tree
for the lunar mission. The same step has been taken for other Mars mission
phases where the lunar and Mars simplified event trees are indistinguishable.
Launch to Low Earth Orbit
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase for an expendable launch vehicle, see
section 6.1. The corresponding simplified event tree is shown in Figure 6-20.
Low Earth Orbit Sp_¢e Vehicl_ Assembly
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase for an expendable launch vehicle, see
section 6.1. The corresponding simplified event trees are shown in Figures 6-
21, 6-22, 6-23 and 6-24. A direct launch to Mars was assumed only with
chemical rocket propulsion since launch from earth with a nuclear rocket
propulsion system appears to be unacceptable to the general public.
Trans-Mars Orbit Insertion
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the martian mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase for a L02 and LH2 fueled expendable launch
vehicle (ALS), see section 6.1. The corresponding simplified event tree for a
LO_/LH2 propelled transfer vehicle is shown in Figure 6-25.
Nuclear thermal propulsion will likely involve the use of liquid
hydrogen as a propellant. Failures of the nuclear thermal booster did not
include an explosion of the system since there will be no oxygen available in
the vicinity of the liquid hydrogen. As such, the simplified event tree in
Figure 6-26 for nuclear thermal propulsion is the same as for chemical
propulsion with the exception of no explosion of the nuclear propulsion
system. Failures were limited to guidance failure and improper thrust. Due
to the short time the nuclear booster would be thrusting, on the order of tens
of minutes, guidance failures and incorrect thrust levels have been assumed to
result in similar circumstances.
The use of nuclear electric propulsion may eliminate some of the
potential accidents and resulting environments found with chemical and nuclear
thermal boosters. Guidance failures and improper thrust levels are treated
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differently. The low thrust and long burn times required more readily allow
remedial action in the event of a failure, see Figure 6-27. It will however,
introduce the potential for impact on the moon during the lunar flyby assumed
for this study.
Mars Orbit Insertion
Potential accidents for this phase of a mission to Mars are listed in
Table 6-15. The aerobrakes and the requirement that the Mars transfer and
Table 6-15
Mars Orbit Insertion Phase Accidents and Resulting
Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Failure to separate
Guidance failure
Aerobrake failure
Collision of transfer and
excursion vehicles
Failure of transfer and
excursion vehicles to
rendezvous
inadvertent reactor startup
Reentry
Impact
Impact
Impact
Projectiles
Explosion
Stranded in orbit
Inadequate heat
rejection path
excursion vehicles separate prior to orbit insertion increase the possibility
for accidents over that of lunar orbit _nsert_on. The s_mplified event tree
for this mission phase where orbit insertion is by aerobrake is shown in
Figure 6-28.
The accident failure to separate was assumed to lead to earth reentry
due to the return-to-earth flyby trajectory nature of potential trans-Mars
orbits. Since the design of the excursion vehicle aerobrake is not defined,
the possibility exists that the excursion vehicle aerobrake would not be
sufficient for earth orbit insertion and could result in uncontrolled reentry.
Orbit insertion guidance and aerobrake structural failures could result
in the excursion vehicle impacting the surface of Mars The atmosphere of
Mars is very thin compared to that of earth (see Appendix) and thus aill not
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provide a similar reentry drag environment. An impact on the surface of Mars
may result in the complete destruction of the reactor.
A collision of the transfer and excursion vehicles during the rendezvous
maneuver may result in reactor impact with structural components of the
vehicles and other cargo and, possibly, an explosion. Propellant tanks may
rupture during the collision yielding a projectile field. A damaged reactor
may release fuel and possibly undergo an excursion. The fuel and fission
products would be released in orbit and on the surface of Mars If the reactor
was to subsequently impact the planet.
A failure to rendezvous has not been listed as a safety-related
accident. The excursion vehicle could be left in orbit until the next piloted
transfer vehicle arrives or it could be sent to the martian surface as in an
unmanned cargo flight. In either case, the reactor would be stored in a safe
configuration.
An inadvertent reactor startup is possible with the reactor heat
rejection system not deployed. As stated previously, a radiation hazard would
be created for the flight crew. A fission product inventory would be created
which may present a hazard to astronauts during emplacement of the reactor on
the surface of Mars.
Mars orbit insertion by nuclear propulsion, thermal or electric, would
not be subject to the potential accidents caused by use of the aerobrake
maneuver and the subsequent rendezvous, see Figure 6-29. Failures of the
nuclear propulsion systems have been limited to guidance and thrust failures
since an explosive source is missing. Resultant trajectories will lead to
earth reentry if no thrusting occurs and the trans-Mars orbit has a return leg
which intersects the earth, surface impact on Mars, and parabolic orbits.
A direct descent to the surface of Mars would have the potential for the
accidents shown in Figure 6-30. Failures consist primarily of the inability
of the transfer and excursion vehicles to separate and the insufficient
performance of the descent (excursion) vehicle. If a single transportation
vehicle is used, separation failure would be precluded. If the transfer and
excursion vehicles did not separate, the transportation vehicles and payload
may return to earth on a flyby trajectory. An explosion of the descent
vehicle may lead to fuel release and possibly an excursion with the remaining
fuel and fission products released upon impact with the surface of Mars.
During this mission phase the excursion and transfer vehicles would
rendezvous if such a transport system was used. The simplified event tree for
this rendezvous is shown in Figure 6-3]. The assumption was made that the
excursion vehicle would be fueled with L02 and LH2. Impact on the surface of
Mars after an explosion in orbit was assumed not possible since the atmosphere
of Mars is too thin to adequately slow down the reactor. The potential
reactor configurations after an accident are a safely stowed reactor stranded
in orbit, a damaged reactor releasing fuel and possibly fission products, and
a reactor operating inadvertently. The stranded, damaged reactor would
contaminate the orbit. An operating reactor may be a hazard to the flight
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crew if the startup occurs when the excursion and transfer vehicles are
attached and after crew transfer to the excursion vehicle. No such problem
would occur for a cargo flight. An option on a cargo flight would be to boost
the excursion vehicle into an escape trajectory.
Descent to Surface of Mars
After a successful separation of the Mars transfer and excursion
vehicles, a guidance error may cause the excursion vehicle to impact the
surface of Mars, see Table 6-16. Propellant tank ruptures during these
Table 6-16
Descent to Surface of Mars Phase Accidents
and Resulting Reactor Environments
Accident Reactor Environment
Guidance failure
Aerobrake failure
Descent engine failure
Inadvertent reactor startup
Impact
Impact
Impact
Explosion
Projectiles
Inadequate heat
rejection path
accidents may provide a source of projectiles. A damaged reactor may lead to
fuel release and possibly, a nuclear excursion. The simplified event tree for
this mission phase is shown in Figure 6-32. A failure of the guidance system
to initiate descent would strand the reactor in orbit.
A failure of the aerobrake during descent will likely cause the
excursion vehicle to tumble out of control. The vehicle may break up. The
reactor may or may not detach from the excursion vehicle. The end result
would be impact on the surface of Mars at high speed. The reactor would also
impact the martian surface should the descent engines fail, e.g., loss of
thrust, guidance error, and failure to ignite. The transition between
aerobrake descent and ignition of the descent engines can result in impact on
the martian surface should the aerobrake fail to properly jettison. In any
case, surface impact may lead to complete reactor destruction.
An inadvertent reactor startup is possible with the reactor heat
rejection system not deployed. Possible resultant events include the
generation of a hazardous radiation field for the flight crew, the generation
of fission products which may pose a hazard during emplacement, and fuel
release.
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For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the Mars mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase, see section 6.1, except for the effects of
the martian atmosphere and soil.
Operation and Maintenance
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the Mars mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase, see section 6.1, except for the effects of
the martian atmosphere and soil. The corresponding simplified event tree is
shown in Figure 6-33. Note the addition of the effects of the atmosphere to
the list of accidents.
Disoosal
For the purposes of this study, the accidents and reactor environments
for this phase of the Mars mission has been assumed to be the same as the
corresponding lunar mission phase, see section 6.1, except for the effects of
the martian atmosphere and soil. Figure 6-34 contains the simplified event
tree for this mission phase option.
6.3 SUMMARY
A preliminary identification of safety issues can now be performed.
Events and nuclear power system responses to events defined in the event trees
which have the potential to leave the reactor in an unsafe configuration are
safety issues. An example would be the environment of Mars. During the
Operation and Maintenance and disposal phases of a mission to Mars, the fuel
and fission product barriers, reactor vessel and fuel pin cladding, could be
breached by the constituents of the martian environment leading to the release
of fuel and fission products. The identification is preliminary because the
event trees and accident envlronments are characterized qualitatively. The
next iteration on this assessment process would be the evaluation of data
available to describe accident environments and the generation of data for
occurrence probabilities. Should reactor response be shown to leave the
reactor in a safe condition or the occurrence probability be sufficiently
small to produce very small contribution to the overall mission risk, the
safety issue would be eliminated. The potential accidents and reactor
responses identified in this chapter may not necessarily lead to a safety
issue which must impact design. A risk assessment is required to put these
potential accidents and hazards in perspective, including non-nuclear and
space environment risks.
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7.0 SAFETY ISSUES
A summary of the safety issues identified in the SP-IO0 program is found
in Table 7-I. These safety issues are relevant to missions to the moon and
Mars with the possible exception of space debris in low earth orbit. The
amount of time spent in low earth orbit will be significantly less than for
proposed SP-IO0 missions. Whether this will result in an insignificant space
debris risk must be determined. An examination of the simplified event trees
developed in evaluating potential accident scenarios in the preceding chapter
reveals that these safety issues are common to the Space Exploration
Initiative missions. These issues have been clearly defined in the SP-IO0
safety program (Refs. V-4 and V-5) and will not be discussed here.
Table 7-1
Compilation of SP-lO0 Program Safety Issues
Hazard to launch vehicle
Criticality in launch vehicle explosion environments
Criticality in water and/or soil
Criticality after reentry and secondary impacts
Toxicity from dispersal of released hazardous materials
Reentry dispersal of fuel and fission products
Space debris penetration of primary coolant boundary
Inadvertent startup and reactivity insertion
Shutdown capability at any time
Fission product release during normal operation
Reactor power control
Loss of coolant, flow, and heat sink
Loss of load
Final shutdown
Decay heat removal
Loss of communication
Loss of safety functiol
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Safety issues which have been identified in addition to those mentioned
above for the SP-IO0 program are listed in Table 7-2. The list order does not
reflect the results of any estimation of the hazard level. Each of these
Table 7-2
Safety Issues Derived From Missions to the Noon
and Mars
Criticality after transfer and excursion vehicle
explosions
High voltage power cables"
Loss of power to habitat"
Radiation emitted during operation and maintenance
(if any)
Mars environment
High speed impact on the moon and Mars
Return flyby trajectories
Disposal after operation on planet
Outpost contamination from released fission
products
Reactor stranded in orbit
Not normally considered a nuclear safety issue
safety issues was identified as a result of the analyses reported in chapter
6. The following discussion presents the safety issues identified as a result
of the preliminary hazards analysis, the results of which were presented in
the preceding chapter.
Criticality is a safety concern following explosions. Projectiles
produced in an explosion in the vacuum of space present a similar potential
for reactor damage as for shrapnel generated by launch vehicles. The
magnitude of the shrapnel environment from explosions of the transfer and
excursion vehlcles is unknown due to the absence of detailed designs.
However, a significant amount of LH2 and L02 will be aboard the transport
vehicles. If propellant tanks with common bulkheads are used, failure of the
bulkhead separating the propellants would result in a confined-by-missile
explosion. Tank yupture dua to excessive tank pressure during propellant
]47
transfer from transfer vehicle to reusable excursion vehicle, if used, may
also produce a hazardous source of projectiles. A reactor excursion would
produce a radiation field hazardous to a flight crew or Space Station Freedom
astronauts. It would likely damage the reactor sufficiently that an
occurrence in low earth orbit or on a trajectory that will allow a return to
earth after a mission abort prior to moon or Mars orbit insertion may be
hazardous to the population of earth.
Power cables on the surface of the moon and Mars will present a safety
hazard to the astronauts. Contact may result in electrocution. Additionally,
power may be loss to the habitat(s). Any loss of power to the habitat(s) is
life threatening without some means to provide emergency backup power. Life
support systems and thermal management will require power to maintain
conditions conducive to the survival of the astronauts. Short term solutions
such as EMUs may be used, but long term solutions will require power or the
base will have to be abandoned. An emergency power system may be required to
maintain the excursion vehicle in a launch ready condition for subsequent base
abandonment.
The radiation field external to a reactor produced during operation will
be a hazard to astronauts on the surface of the planet. Some method of
shielding will be required, whether it be separation distance or physical
barrier or some combination of the two. Shielding studies have been performed
to attempt to determine the optimum configuration. However, astronaut dose
limit requirements have not been properly defined. Both exposure period and
dose plane location have been subject to considerable variability. Astronaut
movement and time spent at a location have not been factored into shielding
studies in sufficient detail. Astronauts will be involved in many activities
which have the potential to expose them to reactor generated radiation fields,
e.g., occupation of the habitat, activities about the habitat area, and
maintenance in the vicinity of the power production area. Also, additional
sources of man-made radiation such as mobile radioisotope power sources have
not been factored into reactor shielding studies. Finally, dose limits which
have previously been defined have been prescribed for different periods of
time. A shield design based upon a 30 day mission will be inadequate for long
term missions such as the 600 day Mars preparatory mission. The shield should
be designed for the longest expected mission to avoid the need for any
retrofit action.
Shielding of the reactor to provide protection to the astronauts
introduces a safety concern from Table 7-1 which had been solved previously in
the SP-]O0 program. Reactor control for SP-]O0 is by external reflectors.
The relatively large neutron leakage of a compact reactor in space allows for
this simple, efficient control method. The placement of shielding material
close around the reactor will, ........ diminish the worth of the reflectors
surrounding the reactor. Neutron scattering from the shielding material back
into the reactor may render the reference flight system reflector control
design inadequate.
The Mars environment is highly corrosive to refractory materials (see
Appendix A). Containment of fuel and fission products must be maintained.
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Missions to the moon and Mars have the potential for high speed surface
impact as noted in chapter 6. Impact will be at high speed due to the lack of
any atmosphere sufficient to reduce velocity by drag forces. Planetary
approach velocities which may reach several km/sec, see Figure 7-1. Earth
impact speeds have been estimated at 269 m/sec for the SP-IO0 (Ref. V-4).
This is an order or magnitude smaller than typical Mars approach speeds.
Additionally, the lack of an atmosphere on the moon and the low density of the
atmosphere on Mars will not provide the vehicle breakup common to reentry on
earth.
Once the transport vehicle has been successfully inserted into the
trans-lunar or trans-Mars orbits, risk to the general population does not
reduce to zero. In the interests of providing the safest mission profile for
flight crews, missions will likely have transfer vehicle flight trajectories
which will allow planet flyby and return to earth should a mission be aborted.
The reactor may be returned to low earth orbit. The issue of the capability
of the returning spacecraft to safely achieve low earth orbit with cargo
attached has not been investigated. The transfer vehicle propulsion system
may not be designed for full cargo return.
Fuel and fission product containment will be an important safety
consideration during planet surface operation and as a factor in the choice of
disposal strategy. Depending upon the amount and type of astronaut activity
in the vicinity of the power production area on the moon, surface
contamination due to a breach of fission product containment may result in
contamination of the habitat. An astronaut traversing a contaminated area may
carry radioactive particles back to the habitat on his EMU. The Mars
environment adds a new dimension to these safety issues. The surface winds
will entrain fission products and disperse them. Additionally, the harsh
environment of Mars will necessitate substantially greater fuel and fission
containment barrier requirements over that required for the moon.
To avoid overlooking a possible safety issue, the circumstance where a
reactor is stranded in orbit has been noted. A reactor may be stranded in
orbit around the earth, the moon or Mars. if a reactor stranded in low earth
orbit cannot be recovered, reentry will occur. This is an obvious hazard to
the general population. SP-IO0 has overcome this hazard by not operating the
reactor until it is in the operating orbit and by designing the reactor to
impact earth intact after the inadvertent reentry. A reactor stranded in
orbit around the moon or Mars will not pose a threat to the general
population, but may pose a threat to subsequent flight crews. The potential
will exist for an inadvertent rendezvous and collision since the reactor will
likely be in an orbit used for subsequen_ missions to the same planetary
outpost. A collision may result in damage to the reactor which is sufficient
to produce a nuclear excursion. The resulting radiation field would be
hazardous to surviving astronauts.
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8.0 SAFETY ISSUE RESOLUTION
8.! SP-IO0 PROGRAMSAFETY ISSUE RESOLUTION
Resolution approaches taken in the SP-IO0 program are listed in Table 8-
i by safety issue. No further comments will be presented since this program
has a well established safety program (Refs. V-4 and V-5) which has documented
this information in many sources.
Table 8-1
SP-IO0 Pro9ram Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 1 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Hazard to launch vehicle
Criticality in launch
vehicle explosion
environments
Primary coolant lithium solid at launch
Insignificant fission product inventory at
launch
Latches and locks on reflectors, safety rods,
gas separators, TEM pumps, power converters,
and radiator panels
Encryption and decryption startup command
sequence
Monitor inhibits while in payload bay
Category ] hazardous functions identified and
inhibited
Category 2 hazardous functions to be identified
in flight program
Reflector and safety rod drives without power
during launch
Fracture control program to be implemented for
beryllium
Automatic shutdown springs used to keep
reflectors and safety rods in safe shutdown
positions while the reactor is in the launch
vehicle
The design is required to meet stress corrosion
cracking requirements
Latches and locks on safety rods to restrict rod
movement relative to fuel
Core subcrltical with full compaction
Honeycomb core structure
Weak llnk in actuator mechanism at shield to
maintain safety rod integrity and alignment
High temperature materials PWC-lI(2741K)
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Table 8-]
SP-]O0 Progrm Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 2 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Criticality in water
and/or soil
Criticality after reentry
and secondary impacts
Toxicity from dispersal
of released hazardous
materials
Reentry dispersal of fuel
and fission products
Rhenium poison provides thermal neutron
absorption
Latches and locks on safety rods to restrict rod
movement relative to fuel
Adequate negative reactivity in safety rods to
ensure subcritical configuration
Reentry heat shield provides predictable water
entry orientation
Honeycomb core structure and reactor vessel
prevents fuel spreading
Weak link in actuator mechanism at shield to
maintain safety rod integrity and alignment
Latches and locks on safety rods to restrict rod
movement relative to fuel during reentry and
impact
Adequate negative reactivity in safety rods to
ensure subcritical configuration
Honeycomb core structure prevents fuel pin
spreading on impact
Reentry shield assures impact orientation and
temperature control
Reentry shield protects against oxidation
during reentry
Small amount of core buckling and crushing
helps prevent safety rods dislodging from
core during impact and burial
Honeycomb supported by fuel pins prevents
disruption of core by solid rocket booster
fragments
Lithium coolant solid at launch
High temperature materials used UN(3123K),
BeO(2803K),PWC-11(2741K)
Fracture control program for beryllium
Reentry shield protects against heat fluxes,
oxidation and aerodynamic loads
Insignificant fission product inventory at
at launch
Bonded fuel cladding
Fission gas plenum for each fuel pin
High temperature materials PWC-]I(274)K)
and carbon-carbon (reentry shield)
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Table 8-1
SP-IO0 Program Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 3 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Space debris penetration
of primary coolant
boundary
Inadvertent startup and
reactivity insertion
Shutdown capability
Fission product release
during normal operation
Primary coolant lithium solid prior to
startup
Auxiliary coolant loop to remove decay heat
in event primary heat transport loop
is inadequate
Beryllium shield over primary coolant loop
piping where exposed to debris
Damage assessment per NASA SP-8042 (Ref. VIII-i)
Latches and locks on safety rods and
reflectors
Two independent means (safety rods and
reflectors) to maintain subcriticality
Rods locked in core prior to startup
Reflectors locked out prior to startup
Actuators not powered prior to startup,
no power to clutches, and no power to
energize brakes
Command required to operate actuators
Three independent inhibits, one of which
precludes startup by RF energy
Shutdown springs load safety rods and
reflectors to least reactive positions
Controller software to meet NSTS fault
tolerance requirements
Control elements (reflectors and rods) are
moved away from and out of the core
individually and incrementally in a pre-
programmed manner to prevent a rapid
reactivity insertion
Encryption and decryption devices and command
sequence
Inadvertent startup inhibits monitored
Two independent means of shutdown (safety rods
and reflectors)
Redundancy in safety rods and reflectors
Bonded fuel cladding
Gas plenum within each fuel pin
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Table 8-1
SP-IO0 Program Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 4 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Reactor power control Negative void, temperature, and power
reactivity feedback coefficients
Two independent shutdown means (safety rods
and reflectors)
Redundancy in safety rods and reflectors
Control elements (safety rods and reflectors)
moved individually and incrementally, maximum
reactivity insertion limited to ].5%/minute
power increase
Redundant sensors for temperature, pressure and
primary coolant flow
Redundant temperature sensors per primary
coolant loop
Diverse thermocouples and Johnson noise sensors
Design basis accidents studied to identify
operating conditions requiring shutdown or
power reduction
Safety rod position limit switches to confirm
location
Reflector continuous position indicators
Control system diagnostics to detect
malfunction to change control sequencing
Control system diagnostics prior to shutdown
to reduce likelihood of spurious scram
Control system diagnostics after shutdown to
determine if autonomous restart appropriate,
battery power will monitor safety systems
up to 1.5 hour after shutdown
Shutdown springs move safety rods and reflectors
to shutdown position upon loss of power to the
actuators
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Table 8-1
SP-IO0 Program Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 5 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Loss of coolant, flow,
and heat sink
Loss of load
Final shutdown
Auxiliary coolant loop removes decay heat in the
event the primary heat transport loop is
inadequate
Design basis accidents requiring shutdown
Two independent means of shutdown with
redundancy
High temperature materials PWC-II(2741K),
UN(3123K)
Beryllium shield over primary coolant loop
piping where exposed to space debris
TEM pumps used for passive, automatic decay heat
removal
Redundant reactor outlet temperature sensors per
primary coolant loop
Diverse thermocouples and Johnson noise sensors
Redundant system pressure sensors initiate
shutdown upon loss of pressure
Diverse methods of decay heat removal with
primary coolant loop and auxiliary coolant
loop
Redundancy with multiple primary and secondary
coolant loops in primary heat transport system
Primary heat transport coolant leaks detected by
pressure sensors
Auxiliary coolant loop leaks detected by
pressure differential
Parasitic shunt
Design basis event requiring power reduction
at shunt failure
Two independent and diverse methods of shutdown
(safety rods and reflectors)
Redundancy in safety rods and reflectors
Automatic at end-of-mission
Uses independent clock with shutdown time preset
at launch and not resettable
Clock powered by critical loads bus
Single fault tolerant
Battery power for restart limited to a few hours
Irreversibly interrupt power supply to reflector
and safety rod clutches
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Table 8-1
SP-IO0 Program Safety Issue Resolution Approaches
(Sheet 6 of 6)
Safety Issue Resolution
Decay heat removal
Loss of communication
Loss of safety function
Diverse methods of decay heat removal with
primary coolant loop and auxiliary coolant
loop
Redundancy with multiple primary and secondary
coolant loops in primary heat transport system
Design basis event requiring shutdown after time
limit exceeded
Design basis event requiring shutdown
8.2 RECOMMENDEDNEW SAFETY ISSUE RESOLUTIONS
The following discussion is restricted to resolution approaches
identified for mission phases and aspects of mission phases not previously
covered by low earth orbit operation applications of reactors in previous
safety assessments, especially the SP-IO0 safety program. The safety issues
addressed are those in Table 7-2.
Criticality After Vehicle Explosions
An explosion in space is always a possibility when using chemical
propulsion (Ref. VIII-2). An explosion of significance requires propellant
and oxidizer to mix and pool. Propellant and oxidizer tanks must rupture
together and the time and means to mix and pool must be provided.
Furthermore, an ignition source is required. This simultaneous rupturing
could occur due to collisions between orbiting vehicles, collisions between
the vehicle and the space station structure, or projectiles emanating from an
exploding rocket engine.
Not all tank ruptures will lead to an explosion; as mentioned
previously, mixing, pooling, and an ignition source are required. Due to the
lack of design data, the possibility exists that the LH2 and L02 may be
configured in the excursion and transfer vehicle tanks in the same manner as
in a Centaur, i.e., LH2 and L02 in a tank separated by a common bulkhead. A
projectile from an exploded rocket engine could impact one compartment of the
tank causing a collapse of the common bulkhead resulting in the mixing and
pooling necessary to allow an explosion. The explosion fragments may provide
the ignition source. Even with ignition, the mixture may only burn
vigorously. The Centaur confined-by-missile mode of explosion from the 1985
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Galileo and Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report (Ref. VIII-3) is an example.
Should the LH2 and LOt be contained in separate tanks, an explosion of
consequence is unlikely, since the means to mix and pool are missing and an
external source of oxygen (e.g., the atmosphere) is also missing. The threat
from Space Shuttle external tank explosions was considered nil after 150,000
ft for this reason (Ref. V-2).
Projectiles, fragments and shrapnel, will be produced due to explosions
of rocket engines and propellant tank ruptures. Not all tank ruptures,
however, will result in projectiles. The majority of the pressurized tanks in
the Shuttle Orbiter are made of titanium (Ti-6AI-4V). These tanks typically
fail due to overpressure by splitting open and relieving pressure. They do
not fragment, but generally split apart in hemispheres. Projectile fields
will also be attenuated by intervening structure. Projectile environments
will be heavily dependent upon the materials and structures used in the
transfer and excursion vehicles.
The SP-IO0 is being designed to remain subcritical during launch
accidents by providing sufficient negative reactivity and the structural
capability to retain this negative reactivity. Neutron absorber rods will be
locked into place inside the reactor core at launch to be removed only upon
the startup command. These rods have been designed to keep the reactor core
subcritical under all postulated reactor configurations resulting from
explosions, projectiles, fragments, and shrapnel. Hydrocode analyses by
General Electric (Ref. I-I) have been performed to verify the rods will remain
in the reactor core during the explosion environments resulting from failures
of the space shuttle. Nuclear reactor accommodation of the explosion
environments possible during any phase of the moon and Mars missions is not
known at this time due to the lack of sufficient design detail of the launch,
transfer, and excursion vehicles. The use of an expendable launch vehicle may
eliminate solid rocket motor casing fragments as a safety concern since the
reactor should be located above any fragment field generated in an explosion
of the launch vehicle.
Radiation Emitted During Operation and Maintenance
Radiation exposure control during operation and maintenance will involve
shielding, distance, and time wherever practical. The particular radiation
exposure limits for astronauts has not been clearly defined.
The National Council on Radiation Protection has published guidelines in
NCRP Report No. 98 (Ref. Iv-IS. These guidelines are listed in Tables 8-2 and
8-3. Annual dose is limited to 50 rem with a 30 day limit of 25 rem. The
career dose limit is dependent upon sex and first-mission age of the
astronaut. These career limits are based upon a lifetime excess risk of
cancer mortality of 3 percent.
Radiation exposure controls for astronauts need to include the effects
of all sources of natural and man-made radiation, both stationary and mobile.
Past shielding studies for stationary (Refs. IV-3 and IV-4) and mobile (Ref.
VIII-4) systems have ignored the presence of sources of man-made radiation in
157
Table 8-2
National Council on Radiation Protection 8utdeltnes for
Exposure of Spaceflight Cre_embers to All Sources
of Radiation (Ref. IV-2)
Time Period Blood Forming Organs
(mSv)
30 days 250
Annual 500
Career See Table 8-3
Table 8-3
National Counctl on Radiation Protection 6uidelines for Career Wholebody Dose-
Equivalent Limits Based on a Lifetime Excess Risk of Cancer Mortality of
3 percent (Ref. IV-2)
Age (years) Female (Sv) Male (Sv)
25 1.0 ] .5
35 1.75 2.5
45 2.5 3.2
55 3.0 4.0
addition to the reactor. This is primarily due to the lack of information on
the complimentary surface power system. An allocation of exposure to natural
and man-made radiation is required. An analysis must be performed of
potential astronaut activity on the surface of the moon and Mars to
characterize the potential for exposure of the astronauts to man-made
radiation sources. Time and distance estimates are required. From this
characterization, an optimum dose limit allocation between mobile and
stationary man-made radiation sources can be made.
The characterization of astronaut activities for the purpose of dose
limit allocations must include all potential missions. A dose limit based
158
upon a 30 day astronaut stay will result in astronaut overexposure during the
600 day lunar mission dress rehearsal for the missions to Mars. Dose limits
should be based upon the longest potential astronaut stay expected during the
lifetime of the nuclear reactor surface power system.
Dose limits have not been suggested based upon a realistic and complete
set of dose plane locations. Dose limits for man-made radiation emanating
from surface nuclear reactors have been proposed for the habitat area at
various distances from the power production area (e.g., ] km and 5 km), at
arbitrary distances, and at the innermost point of the radiator panels.
Shielding requirements for lunar surface operations of mobile DIPS units have
been investigated and the results reported in Reference VIII-4 where
separation distance and exposure time control were used for an unpressurized
manned/robotic rover. No allowance was made for man-made radiation from
surface nuclear reactors and exposure limits were based upon balances
estimated as shown in Table 8-4.
Table 8-4
Radiation Exposure to Astronauts on Noon (Ref. VIII-4)
Sources of Radiation Mission L_nqth (days)I
30 go 180 365 600
Natural sources
1. Earth-moon-earth
2. Lunar surface
3. Solar particle event
(]0 gm/cm" shield)
Total dose
NCRP-98 guidelines
Dose balance (rem/mission)
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
1.0 3.2 6.6 13.3 22.0
1.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 4.0
6.5 8.7 12.1 20.0 30.3
25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 lO0.O
18.5 41.3 37.9 30.0 69.7
IMission length includes 4 days for round trip to moon.
Proper sizing and comparison of shielding alternatives will require the
allocation of dose limits at prescribed locations. Various astronaut
activities will require them to perform duties at the habitat area, at the
launch/landing site, at the soil processing plant, and at locations away from
the outpost which will require travel outside the protection of the habitat on
surface rovers. A shadow shield to protect the astronauts at the habitat may
not provide any protection at other locations. A total dose limit must be
recognized as the summation of the doses acquired from the various locations
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astronauts will be performing their duties. Also, dose limits should be
separated into nominal and emergency limits. A nominal limit should reflect
the diversity of duties required of each individual astronaut, not necessarily
the worst case exposure compiled from all astronaut duties. Emergency limits
should be set to reflect the availability of an excursion vehicle for outpost
abandonment in addition to the consequences to the astronauts of power system
failure.
M_r@ Environment
In addition to the C02 atmosphere, the martian soil has been found to
contain oxidants, see Appendix A. The martian soil is periodically entrained
and suspended in the atmosphere by surface winds. Also, HzS04 and HCf
aerosols are believed to be present in the wind blown dust. Reactor materials
will be required to withstand the C02 atmosphere and these oxidants and acids
during operation and for long term storage if final disposal is on the surface
of Mars.
The Reference Flight System SP-]O0 uses refractory metals due to the
high temperatures required for operation within design constraints of mass and
payload envelope. These materials are not compatible with long term operation
and disposal on the surface of Mars. This problem is well known and has been
identified previously (Ref. IV-3). Current efforts to investigate
environmental effects on SP-]O0 refractory materials is limited to low earth
orbit conditions, e.g., meteoroids, debris, atomic oxygen, and plasma (Ref.
VIII-B). Research is required for material compatibility with the martian
environment. Coatings such as silicide for refractory metals need to be
investigated for long term reliability. Reactor designs using alternate
materials, such as stainless steel, which operate at lower temperatures and
are compatible with the martian environment need to be considered. Isolation
of the refractory materials from the martian environment should be
investigated as a potential solution. The refractory metals could be encased
in a vessel which supports a vacuum or inert atmosphere between the outside
vessel and the inner refractory materials, e.g., encase the primary coolant
loop piping in a stainless steel tubing with a vacuum between them.
Hiqh Speed Impa{t on the Moon and Mars
Both high and low speed impacts are possible during a flight to the moon
or Mars. Low speed impacts involve such diverse accidents as dropping the
reactor on the lunar and martian surfaces; planet surface transportation cart
rollover; handling accidents at planet orbit rendezvous and on the surface of
the planet; and low speed collisions during orbital maneuvers in low earth
orbit. High speed impacts are possible during a flight to the moon or Mars.
High speed impacts on the lunar and Mars surfaces may occur during moon/Mars
orbit insertion and descent to the surface. They may also occur during
launch from the earth and upon return to the earth should the space vehicle
fail to orbit the moon or Mars and return to the earth. The issue of a return
to earth without orbiting the moon or Mars is discussed below under the safety
issue of return flyby trajectories. An additional possibility for lunar
surface impact may occur if nuclear electric propulsion is used and the trans-
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lunar orbit requires a gravity assist flyby of the _Loon.
Impact speeds may be as high as planet approach velocities, 2 to 7 km/s
(7 to 23 kft/s) for Mars (Figure 7-I), since the moon has no atmosphere and
Mars has too little atmosphere to adequately slow down the spacecraft. The
reactor is unlikely to survive such an impact on the moon or Mars. The SP-]O0
reactor is being designed to survive a 269 m/s impact on pavement grade
concrete. The risk to the mission from this type of accident will have to be
estimated taking into account flight path angle, incoming velocity, and the
aerobrakes. Guidance system failures should be the dominate risk contributor.
Highly reliable transfer vehicle guidance systems will minimize risk. The
reactor must be designed to survive earth reentry so that the risk to the
general population is insignificant.
The nuclear power system will not be operated until it is emplaced on
the surface of the moon or Mars. This wil!minimize the radioactivity
inventory.
An environmental hazard would be meteoroid impact. An impact analysis
needs to be performed to determine the minimum meteor mass required as a
function of velocity to penetrate the fuel cladding. With this mass, the risk
can be estimated from this high speed impact source for comparison with other
mission risks to determine the need for any extra precautions.
Return Flyby Trajectories
Flights to the moon and Mars are likely to use trans-lunar and trans-
mars trajectories which will allow return to earth should the space vehicle
propulsion system fail to function for orbit insertion. This type of
trajectory would be failsafe. If a failure in the propulsion system used for
orbit insertion around the moon or Mars is detected during the trans-lunar or
trans-Mars trajectory phase of the mission or the system fails to operate when
commanded, a return flyby trajectory would allow the space vehicle to return
to earth with little or no additional thrusting for retrieval of astronauts
and cargo. The propulsion system may be either chemical or nuclear. The term
return flyby trajectory has been used to denote a trajectory from the earth to
the moon or Mars which would not require a significant thrust at the moon or
Mars to insert the space vehicle into a trajectory which will return the space
vehicle to the earth. The returning space vehicle would contain the original
cargo, including the surface power system reactor. The potential exists for
the returning space vehicle to reenter the earth's atmosphere should the
propulsion system failure preclude an earth avoidance maneuver. Reactor earth
reentry survival in a subcritical configuration will have to be guaranteed so
that the risk to the general population is insignificant.
The preferred resolution to reduce the risk to the general population to
an insignificant level would be ejection of the nuclear reactor at some time
in the return flyby trajectory when such an action poses very little threat to
the general population. This would be the most likely means of reducing the
threat since a return flyby trajectory would probably call for ejection of the
cargo and unused propellant since transfer vehicles do not appear to be
designed for insertion into low earth orbit with such a large mass. It is not
161
clear that the propulsion system for the SEI space vehicles would be capable
of earth orbit insertion with the full cargo. The return trajectory should
have a perigee altitude of at least 1000 km in case ejection of the reactor
fails. If ejection of the reactor is not possible, the transfer vehicles
would have to be designed to accommodate this mission abort scenario. The
transfer vehicle would have to be designed so that the aerobrake, or the
attached excursion vehicle, could safely insert the spacecraft into orbit
about the earth. The particular flight maneuvers associated with earth orbit
insertion should be chosen to minimize risk to the general population.
Because the reactor will not be operated until it is emplaced on the surface
of the moon or Mars, mission risk will not be aggravated by a fission product
inventory. The safety issue of a nuclear propulsion system as part of this
returning space vehicle was not addressed since it was outside the scope of
this task.
Disposal Aftec Operation on Planet
The problem of safe disposal of the used nuclear reactor core is a
complex issue. The problem involves fuel and fission product containment,
radiation exposure and diversion.
Three disposal schemes have been proposed: 1) storage in place, 2)
storage away from the power production area, and 3) insertion into a parabolic
trajectory. Of the three, disposal by insertion into a parabolic trajectory
will involve launching the used reactor core from the surface of the moon and
Mars. Disposal by parabolic trajectory from the moon and Mars has the
potential for accidents during launch from the planet surface and boost from
orbit around the planet. These accidents may leave the planet surface or the
orbit contaminated. An unplanned retrieval from orbit will create
circumstances for additional accidents and significant radiation exposure to
astronauts if their presence is required.
Disposal by launching the used reactor core to a nuclear safe orbit
about the moon or Mars (not one of the preferred disposal schemes) would
result in the used reactor presenting a hazard for future flights. Boost to a
nuclear safe orbit from low earth operating orbits has always been desirable
in other missions, e.g., SP-100 and Multimegawatt, since it minimizes the risk
to the public and the cost of disposal. As previously mentioned, launches
from the moon and Mars will involve the potential for contamination of the
planet surface after a launch accident.
Lunar and Mars surface disposal, i.e., storage in place or away from the
power production area, eliminates the hazards associated with schemes that
require launching from the planet surface for disposal. However, the
environmental safety concerns become important for long periods of time.
Storage by these means will require fission product containment for hundreds
of years. During long storage times, provisions must be made to restrict
access to the storage areas to avoid overexposure to the radiation. These
provisions must be viable for the time required to either allow for
radioactive decay to reduce the radiation hazard to acceptable levels or until
a safer_method of disposal can be found. Markers may have to be employed to
prevent losing track of the disposal site over hundreds of years.
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Any method of surface storage of the used nuclear reactor fuel would be
dependent upon the need to remove the used core from the power production area
for such purposes as reusing portions of the existing power system versus the
ability to safely remove the used core without overexposing the astronauts or
contaminating the environment while removing the spent fuel. This issue has
been considered should the decision be made in the future to require the
removal of the reactor from the vicinity of the base. A commitment to
permanent human occupation of the lunar surface may require removal of the
used reactors from the base area to avoid clustering these radioactive sources
around the base. Spent fuel removal could be accomplished by means of robots
to prevent astronaut exposure. Should the use of robots to remove the fuel
fail, remedial efforts may be required; these should minimize astronaut
exposure. Spent reactor fuel stored on Mars would be required to withstand
the martian environment for many years. A risk assessment must be performed
to assist in determining which disposal scheme is best. The disposal strategy
must have minimum astronaut interaction and adequate long term safe storage
with minimum risk.
OUtDOSt Contamination
Accidents on the surface of the moon and Mars may result in the release
of fission products. Contamination of the surface may result in contamination
of the habitats. Astronauts may walk through a contaminated area and carry
the fission products to the habitat on the extravehicular mobility unit.
Containment of the fission products on the surface of Mars will be further
complicated by the martian winds. A reactor containment/guard vessel is
recommended.
_actor Stranded In Orbit
The Space Exploration Initiative mission profiles will increase the
number of potential accidents in low earth orbit which may lead to inadvertent
reentry above that for previous SP-IO0 mission profiles. However, most of the
new accidents will not introduce any new reentry environment that has not been
identified in the SP-IO0 program. Those accidents which strand an undamaged
reactor in earth orbit may result in the reactor entering the atmosphere under
conditions for which the SP-IO0 reactor is currently being designed. A
damaged reactor, however, has the potential to release fuel during inadvertent
reentry and earth impact (Ref. VIII-I). A risk assessment (Ref. VIII-I) has
been performed of potential SP-IO0 missions involving the inadvertent reentry
of a damaged reactor. The risk was found to be low. A new reactor would have
to be analyzed and tested as the SP-IO0 has been, and as a flight qualified
SP-IO0 would have to be.
A reactor stranded in orbit about the moon or Mars will not pose a risk
to the population of the earth. However, it may pose a hazard to future
flights which require insertion into the same orbit to descend to the outpost.
The hazard associated with an intact reactor orbiting about the moon or Mars
may be insignificant or easily resolved by tracking. A damaged reactor which
Is part of a debris field resulting from an accident may pose a hazard of
significance. A reactor which has undergone an excursion may add a
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radioactive element to the hazard. The risk to a mission of a reactor
stranded in orbit about the moon or Mars is expected to be low because
transfer vehicle designs will maximize the chances for astronaut survival and
this design philosophy will reduce the probability for a reactor stranded in
orbit. An analysis needs to be performed to validate that the risk to a
mission of a nuclear reactor, damaged or not, stranded in orbit about the moon
or Mars is low.
Although the following safety issues are not usually considered nuclear
system safety issues, they have been included for completeness. Astronaut
contact with the high voltage power cables and the loss of power to the
habitat life support systems threaten the lives of the astronauts. As part of
the total power system design, including power distribution and backup for
critical life support systems, these issues are discussed below.
High Voltage P_wer Cables
One option for the distribution of power from the nuclear reactor to the
various areas of the outpost is cable placed above ground. Whether this cable
is placed on the surface or suspended above the surface, it will be a safety
hazard to the astronauts. Either physical barriers or proximity warning
systems should be used to protect the astronauts. Possible methods to protect
the astronauts would be suspending the cable high enough to allow any vehicle
to pass safely below, posting warning signs and beacons along the length of
the cable, developing a warning system installed in EMUs which would alert the
astronaut to the presence of the cables, and restricting access to areas in
the outpost by physical barriers and the establishment of pathways to be used
within the outpost area. There is likely a very large number of solutions to
this safety hazard, a combination of some of which will provide safe working
conditions without a significant mass penalty.
Loss of Power to Habitat
This issue is not normally considered a nuclear safety issue. It has
been included here because it does have an impact on the safety of the
astronauts. The following discussion will have some application to any
central power system used on the moon and Mars.
In all cases where the nuclear reactor is shutdown due to a failure and
in some cases where power is reduced, the habitat will not have sufficient
power to maintain life support systems. It is the responsibility of the power
system designer to prevent a power system response which will place the
astronauts in a life threatening situation. An uninterruptible power source
must be provided which will maintain minimum life support capabilities.
Habitat power requirements in the case of nuclear reactor shutdown or
power-down will be time dependent based upon the response of the habitat life
support systems to a loss of power. Power requirements immediately after loss
of power may be very small, only that needed to provide lighting and energy to
open and close airlocks so that astronauts will be able to exit the habitat to
obtain other sources of power that are available to replace the nuclear
reactor until it is repaired or the outpost is abandoned. An analysis must be
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performed to identify the power needs of systems after a nuclear reactor power
system shutdown or power reduction.
The solution to this safety hazard will require the mix of stationary
and mobile surface power systems be coordinated. Safety requirements will
certainly demand all systems meet specific availability 9oals. These goals
may result in a set of mobile power source units always located at the outpost
within specified distances from the habitat. Photovoltaic power sources may
supplant mobile power sources during the lunar day.
A reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) analysis is
required of all surface power systems (including extravehicular mobility
units) with respect to meeting the life support requirements of the
astronauts. These life support requirements would include maintenance of the
excursion vehicle to provide the astronauts the option to abandon the outpost.
The goals of the RAM analysis must be consistent with the purpose of the
outpost and the restrictions placed upon any emergency options due to the
remoteness of the outpost from earth and the harsh environment in which the
outpost exists.
Reactors designed for low earth orbit applications are typically
required to meet reliability goals. Reliability goals are used for systems
which are not repairable. The nuclear reactor power system for the moon and
Mars may have some degree of repairability. Also, the availability of power
to the astronauts is most important. As such, it would seem that an
availability goal is more appropriate. A nuclear power system should be
designed with an availability goal(s) for power to sustain life support
systems and other vital power consumers as a part of a total power management
and distribution system of stationary and mobile power sources. A RAM
analysis is advised.
8.3 SP-IO0 RESOLUTIONSREVISITED
The missions postulated for the SP-]OO Reference Flight System have been
in orbit about the earth without the presence of astronauts. The use of an
SP-IO0 as a power source on the surface of the moon and Mars requires the
reactor power system to be man-rated and be subject to a new set of potential
accident environments and operating conditions. This section contains a
discussion of the results of a cursory examination of the safety issue
resolution approaches and design features used in the SP-]OO Reference Flight
System in light of the new missions.
Launch Abort@
Larger launch vehicles have been proposed for the lunar and Mars
missions. When sufficient design details are forth coming, data
characterizing the environments resulting from launch vehicle failures will
have to be generated and compiled in the same manner as has been done for the
Space Shuttle (Ref. VIII-6) and the Titan IV (Ref. VIII-7). These new
environments and failure rates will then be used to design the nuclear reactor
to survive these environments as has been done for the Galileo spacecraft
(Ref. V-2) and will be accomplished for the SP-]O0.
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Diversion
The safety issue of diversion has been previously covered in the SP-IO0
program. Additional potential diversion conditions would result from
inadvertent reentries due to unsuccessful flights to the moon and Mars where
the nuclear reactor would return to earth on safe return flyby trajectories.
As discussed above concerning return flyby trajectories, this safety issue
could be solved by ejection of the reactor into space away from the earth.
Decay Heat Removal
The SP-IO0 Reference Flight System uses the primary coolant loop and the
auxiliary coolant loop systems to remove decay heat from the reactor core
after shutdown. The auxiliary coolant loop system consists of bayonet tubes
inside the reactor core in which coolant is pumped by TEM pumps to a radiator
where the heat is rejected to space. The primary coolant loops also use TEM
pumps. These systems have been designed for operation in zero-g space.
A steady state analysis (Ref. VIII-8) was performed to determine the
feasibility of designing a primary heat transport loop with the capability of
removing reactor decay heat by natural convection. The study was based upon a
2.36 MW, SP-]O0 reactor operating on the lunar surface with either a Brayton
or a Stirling power conversion subsystem. The reactor-to-Stirling heat
exchanger was assumed to have properties similar to that of the Brayton heat
exchanger. Two flat linear induction pumps were assumed in series in the
single loop. Figures 8-I and 8-2 illustrate the temperature differences
developed across the reactor as a function pipe height and diameter. Figure
8-1 presents results of the analysis at one second after shutdown and Figure
8-2 presents similar results for 50 seconds after shutdown. Temperature
differences were on the order of 100 C to 200 C for a configuration of 6 m
from reactor to heat exchanger with 8 cm diameter pipe. Thus, excessive
temperatures would not occur if the reactor design used natural convection in
the primary coolant loop should the secondary heat transfer loop fail to
provide a heat sink. A transient analysis is required to confirm that reactor
temperatures are not excessive.
A potential method to accomodate a loss of coolant accident is
containment of the primary coolant loop inside a guard vessel. When the
primary loop fails, the escaping coolant would be contained within the guard
vessel. The guard vessel would be designed so that the captured coolant would
cover the reactor and decay heat would be rejected by heat pipes or radiator
attached to the guard vessel wall or by direct radiation. A cursory steady
state thermal analysis was performed to determine the temperature drop from
the reactor to the guard vessel for a lunar application. The break in the
primary loop was assumed to have occurred so that the coolant levels inside
the guard vessel and inside the reactor primary loop were the same. The
resulting temperature drop was on the order of g50 to ]000 °F. Only
conduction heat transfer was assumed since analysis had indicated that natural
convection heat transfer was doubtful. However, the analysis indicated that
it is possible to remove the decay heat by boiling. Provided the pressure
inside the guard vessel c_n be kept close to the martian atmospheric pressure,
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the lithium saturation temperature of 1156 K (corresponding to maximum
atmospheric pressure) would be well below the normal operating temperature of
the reactor. A transient analysis is required to estimate peak fuel cladding
temperatures to verify this method of accommodating a loss of coolant
accident. Should this method be found adequate, an auxiliary coolant loop
system such as used on SP-IO0 would not be used.
Gas Manaqement
To remove the threat of uncovering the reactor core due to gas formation
inside the primary coolant, a gas separator/accumulator has been used for SP-
100. This should be eliminated in favor of a conventional expansion tank
similar to those used for terrestrial reactors. This will take advantage of
the effects of gravity and yield a more reliable system.
Reactor Control
Reactor control with BeO reflectors may not be adequate for a man-rated
reactor. Leakage out the reactor may be significantly reduced by a man-rated
shield in close proximity to the reactor. Poison backed reflectors may be
required to reduce the backscattering produced by the shield. An analysis
with benchmark testing is required.
Currently, the possibility of astronauts performing maintenance or
repair activities is remote. As such, consideration should not be given to a
reactor design which allows for replacement and maintenance of reflectors,
safety rods, and reflector and rod drive mechanisms.
Power to monitor reactor status and restart the reactor after shutdown
for the SP-]O0 reactor is provided by battery for a very short period of time,
on the order of a few hours. This may not be sufficient for reactor
applications on the moon and Mars if system diagnosis is to be performed and
some repair work is to also be performed. A much longer period of time will
be required for diagnosis and repair in addition to startup. To minimize the
chances for astronaut overexposure during repair activities after shutdown, an
uninterruptible power supply to the nuclear power system monitoring and safety
systems should be provided. This power supply may consist of batteries for
the short period of time required to locate and move a mobile power source to
the reactor site. A RAM analysis would determine power source requirements
based upon the mean-times-to-diagnosis and -repair the reactor failures. A
nuclear reactor power system without the possibility of repair would eliminate
this safety issue. However, the ability to monitor a failed system until a
safe shutdown has been accomplished would be wise.
The conventional approach to regulating the electric load demand for an
unattended space nuclear power system is to employ a shunt resistor between
the power system and the load. This method requires the reactor operate at
full thermal power at all times. The difference between the power output of
the power system and the load is rejected into space as heat. Unnecessary
fuel burnup results if the load demand is lower than the power produced.
However, the shunt is required if the integrated power system is not
inherently load following. A study (Ref. VIII-g) of the integrated SP-IO0
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thermoelectric converter power system has shown that the power system may not
be load following at all demand levels. For any region where the power system
would not be load following, a shunt regulator could be employed. There have
been studies suggesting the use of active feedback controllers (Refs. VlII-lO
and VIII-11). The design of such control systems are in the conceptual stage.
A dynamic power conversion system designed to be load following is suggested
to eliminate this problem.
Inadvertent Startup
Inadvertent startup of the reactor is currently prevented by locking
safety rods inside the reactor core and reflectors in the least reactive
position. To move these rods and reflectors, a coded command sequence is
required to power the rod and reflector actuators. For SEI applications,
inadvertent startup should be prevented by using a key lock mechanism which
requires an astronaut or robot to initiate startup. This mechanism could be
similar to those used on the SNAP and SP-IO0 programs at launch.
{nd of Life Shutdown
End-of-life shutdown is a safety issue because a nuclear reactor that
fails to shutdown may preclude access to the power production site to emplace
a replacement reactor or to remove the reactor for disposal away from the
power production area. Final shutdown should be accomplished by a clock
mechanism which will activate at a preset time set prior to operation. Thls
preset time must not be resettable. The clock mechanism must be single fault
tolerant. It must operate independently of the reactor operating mode or the
power conversion subsystem operation. It must also irreversibly interrupt the
power supply to the reactor control drives, both safety rods and reflectors.
Availability
Reactors designed for low earth orbit applications are typically
required to meet reliability goals. Because reliability and safety are so
closely related, some discussion is necessary concerning reliability goals and
their applicability to planet surface reactor power systems for manned
missions. Reliability goals are used for systems which are not repairable.
The nuclear reactor power system for the moon and Mars may have some degree of
repairability. Also, the availability of power to the astronauts is most
important. As such, it would seem that an availability goal is more
appropriate. A nuclear power system should be designed with an availability
goal(s) for power to sustain life support systems and other vital power
consumers as a part of a total power management and distribution system of
stationary and mobile power sources.
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APPENDIXA
LUNARANDIIARTIANENVIRONNENTS
I74
To accomplish a safety issue identification, It is necessary to predict
power system response to the environments to which it will be exposed. This
section contains a brief summary of the lunar and martian environments. The
information presented was taken from References A-I and A-2.
Moon
The atmospheric density mea§ured during the Apollo program indicated a
surface nighttime value of 2 x IO_ molecules/cm °, approximately sixteen orders
of magnitude less than earth standard. Lunar atmosphere composition is listed
in Table I.
Table 1
Lunar Atmosphere (Ref. A-I)
Gas
Day
Concentration
(molecules/cm 3)
Night
H2 < 6 x 10 _ < 4 x 10 4
He 2 x 103 4 X 10 4
Ne - < 10 s
Ar - < 3 x 103
The surface of the moon has two major regions, maria with vast plains of
basaltic lava flows and the highlands. The surface of the moon is strongly
fragmented. This mantle, the regolith, consists of shocked fragments of
rocks, minerals, and glass spherules formed by meteor impact. The maria
regolith varies from 3 to 16 meters thick and the highlands have a regolith
depth of at least IO meters. The typical composition of the regolith is shown
in Table 2 with a few physical properties listed in Table 3.
Meteor impact rate per cm2 is believed to be between 1.1 and 50 craters
per million years for craters greater than 500_Jm. The micrometeoroid flux
for the lunar surface has been estimated to be modeled by the following:
Log N - - 14.64 1.584 Log m - 0.063 (Log m) 2, 1012 gm_m_IO "e gm
and
Log N - - 14.671 - 1.213 Log m, 10e gm_m_ ] gm.
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Table 2
Regoltth Chemistry (Ref. A-l)
Compound Weight %
Si02 44.5
A1203 26.0
TiO 2 0.39
FeO 5.77
HgO 8.06
CaO 14.9
Na20 O. 25
CraOa O. 06
Table 3
Lunar Regoltth Phystcal Properties (Ref. A-l)
Parameter Nominal Value
Thermal Conductivity (cal/sec-cm-K)
Thermal Inertia (cm2-sec'12K/cal)
Specific Heat (cal/gm-K)
Emissivity
I - 2.8 x 10s
400- 1000
0.20
0.9- 1.0
It has been postulated that meteoroid impacts will result in the ejection of
lunar material up to an altitude of 30 km. An average annual individual
cumulative lunar ejecta flux-mass distribution over three ranges of the ejecta
velocity, Vw, is described by
Log Nw - - 10.79 - 1.2 Log m,
Log NW - - 11.88 - ].2 Log m,
and
where
O<V_<0.1 km/sec,
O. I < V_ _ 0.25 km/sec,
Log Nw- - 13.41 - 1.2 Log m, 0.25_V_ 1.0 km/sec,
Nw - number of ejecta particles of mass m or greater per m2-sec,
m - particle mass (gm),
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VW - particle velocity (km/sec).
Figure I shows a model of the lunar surface temperature as a function of
thermal inertia. A thermal inertia value of 800 cm2-sec112-K/cal appears to
best fit data taken at the lunar equator.
Mars
Key physical properties of Mars are listed in Table 4. The composition
of the martian atmosphere is mostly carbon dioxide as shown in Table 5. Wind
Table 4
Key Phystcal Properties of Nars (Ref. A-2)
Surface Temperature (K)
Insolation; Average Surface
at Equator (kW/m 2)
Surface Pressure (mbar)
Water Vapor (_bar)
Surface Wind Speed (m/sec)
130-300
0.18
6-15
0.13
2-7
Table 5
Nartlan Atmosphere (Ref. A-2)
Gas Mole Percent
C02 95.3
N2 2.7
Ar 1.6
02 0.13
H20 0.03
CO 0.07
Ne 2.5 ppm
Kr 0.3 ppm
Xe 0.08 ppm
Os 0.03 ppm
driven dust layers are only centimeters or less thick. Data have indicated
wind speeds up to 30 m/sec at the surface. Atmospheric dust is characterized
in Table 6. The martian atmosphere Is believed to be saturated with water
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Figure I Lunar Equatorial Temperature as a Function of Time and
Thermal Inertia (Ref. A-I).
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vapor at night. Frost was found at the Viking landing sites.
Table 6
Harttan Atmospheric Dust (Ref. A-2)
Dust Concentration
Dust Column Loading
(during storm)
Air Column Loading
Mean Dust Particle Size
10 ppm
0.001 gm/cm 2
20 gm/cm 2
2.spin
Models for the martian atmosphere are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Mean
low and high pressures are plotted in Figure 2. The density model couples the
cool temperature model with the low pressure model and the warm temperature
model with the high pressure model. The cool, low pressure model would best
represent the atmosphere in late northern summer at a latitude of 45 degrees.
The warm, high pressure model represents early southern summer at a latitude
of 25 degrees. Figure 4 shows the surface daily mean pressure as a function
of time over one martian year (687 days) at the two Viking landing sites. The
scale labeled L. represents the aerocentric longitude of the Sun. Pressures
and deviations are in millibar. Diurnal temperatures observed at the two
Viking landing sites over a period of one sol (24.46 hr) varied from ]80 K to
240 K.
Estimates have been made of the soil composition of the martian surface
and are shown in Table 7. The sum of the compounds does not equal 1.0 due to
Table 7
Composition of Hartian Soil (Ref. A-2)
Compound Weight %
SiO 2
A1203 5.7
Fe203 ]8.2
MgO 8.3
CaO 5.6
K=,O <0.3
TiO o.g
S03 7.7
C1 0.7
44.7
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the inability of the Viking I lander to detect elements with atomic numbers
less than 12 (phosphorus). Mechanical properties are shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Mechanical Properties of Martian Soll (Ref. A-2)
Parameter Nominal Value
Thermal Conductivity (cal/sec-cm-K)
Thermal Inertia (cm2-sec1_-K/cal)
Specific Heat (cal/gm-K)
Emissivity
Albedo
Bulk Density (gm/cm 3)
Penetration Resistance (N/cm2/cm)
Adhesion (N/cm3)
Density (gm/cm°)
2 - 20 x 10.5
100 - 600
0.15 - 0.19
o.g 0.98
0.2 0.4
1 - 1.8
0.01 - 0.I
10 "4 _ 103
3.933
Surface materials contain absorbed water (1%) and carbon dioxide (50 - 100
ppm). Liquid water cannot exist on the martian surface. Evidence points to a
permafrost layer varying from I km at the equator to several kilometers at the
poles. Within 40 degrees of the equator the ground is dehydrated to a depth
of at least one meter.
Oxidants have been found in the martian soil. Experiments on the Viking
landers indicated that oxidizing compounds such as peroxides and superoxides
are present in the martian soil which is periodically suspended in the
atmosphere by the wind. Additionally, the presence of H2S04 and HCl aerosols
in the wind blown dust have been indicated.
A-I
A-2
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